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ABSTRACT

Four school districts were identified and selected to participate in the incentive project. One school each in Duval County, Florida; San Antonio, Texas; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Oakland, California was selected as an implementation site for either the teacher model of the teacher/parent model. Contracts were drafted for each site for payment of incentives to teachers and/or parents. This report evaluates the success of the project in general and at each of the sites in an attempt to synthesize the results into some generalizations about the impact of the Project as a change agent separate from its impact on results. General conclusions drawn by the evaluators indicate that the change process impact of the project is largely a function of (1) local environment, (2) pay scales, (3) school site administration and management styles, and (4) geographic characteristics. Differences in models -- i.e., "parent/teacher" vis-a-vis "teacher" did not seem to have as much effect as did the above factors. An analysis of hypotheses for each site is also included. Related documents are EA 004 804 and EA 004 875. (Author/JF)

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

USE OF INCENTIVES PROJECT

U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION
Washnington, D.C. 20202

Contract OEC-0-71-4768

July 1, 1972

Submitted by:

MONITORING and ASSISTANCE CONTRACTOR

EA 004 874

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As the first structured field experiment in the use of incentives for parents' and teachers' education, this project would never have been implemented without the cooperative efforts of many. Education Turnkey Systems, Inc. expresses its appreciation to all the participating school districts, especially the four Project Directors for bearing the burden of data gathering and reporting. The cooperation of other administrators, teachers, and parents interfacing with our operation was excellent, with few exceptions. The close working relationship between the U. S. Office of Education Project Director, Mr. Edward Glassman and the Planning and Evaluation staff and Education Turnkey personnel would be considered enviable by most government contractors engendering a good working relationship.

The team effort of Education Turnkey staff also merits personal appreciation; Hunter Temple, project manager and senior analyst; Alfred Morin, documentation; Howard Lesnick, responsible for the curriculum audit; Don Pricer, chief management and technical assistant; Blair Curry and Jack Sweeney, responsible for the cost analysis; the four on-site monitors, Joshua Theriot, Beverly Crooms, Tim Nicholson, and Price Michael; and especially the administrative support staff for "putting up with" the staff professionals.

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PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR

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PART I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Unlike Part IV of the Evaluation Report, which deals specifically with the hypotheses and results, the purpose of this summary is to attempt to synthesize the results into some generalizations about the impact of the Incentives Project as a change agent separate from its impact upon results. Although each site must be examined within its own context, an overview is desirable to ascertain if some characteristics are common within and between the teacher models and teacher/parent models.

* * *

At this juncture, prior to the determination of post-test results, it would appear that the change process impact of the project is largely a function of: a) local environment, b) pay scales, c) school site administration and management styles, and d) geographic characteristics more than a difference in models (i.e., "Parent/teacher" vis a vis "teacher").

The two sites that appear to have been most affected by the offer of incentives are Duval County, Florida and San Antonio, Texas. The fact that the former is a teacher only model and the latter is a parent/teacher model does not appear to have any bearing on the change process observed during the year. In both cases, more enthusiasm and concern for the project was noted than in the Cincinnati and Oakland sites. In trying to analyze the common ingredients that pertain to the first two sites, certain elements or factors stand out.

First, both of these sites have the lowest pay scales; the average sixth grade teacher salary in the San Antonio experimental school is $8,268, and in Duval County the sixth grade teachers average a salary of $9,525. This compares with $11,837 in

Oakland and $11,310 in Cincinnati. Certainly the marginal impact of a possible $1,200 would be greater in the two Southern sites than in the Northern sites. Care should be taken in emphasizing this factor too heavily, however, for the salary is only one of the common aspects observed and must be viewed within the total framework.

Second, an important variable common to both sites is the effect of the management styles of the building principals. At both the Duval County and San Antonio sites, the experimental school principals are strong individuals who have a controlling, if not persuasive, influence on the faculties and general environments of the schools. Both have been extremely supportive of the project and have taken a great deal of pride in the fact that their schools have been selected for the project. In Cincinnati, the impact of the building principal was altered due to the fact that she was absent from school because of ill health during the last three months. The void created had an important impact on the general environment and condition of the school during the last critical months. We suspect that this lack of leadership will have an effect on the student results, due to the general condition of uncertainty created at the school. In Oakland, the principal has been supportive of the project, but not to the degree witnessed in Duval County or San Antonio. Furthermore, his management style is not as strong as that of the previously mentioned principals.

A third variable common to all project sites is the local educational environment. In the two sites indicating greatest change, the educational environment is more conducive to the incentives type of project. Although this environment is difficult to define, it is characterized by the willingness of the school personnel to "go along with" the wishes of the central administration. This is, in part, a function of the historical pattern and, in part, a function of current central administrative thrust. In both Duval County and

San Antonio, the individual teachers (not necessarily the teacher organization representatives) have traditionally accepted the desires of the administrative hierarchy with little or no opposition. The condition in Cincinnati has been affected by recent budget cuts, a new superintendent, and change in the composition of the school board. Hence, an even flow of authority and acceptance of that authority is presently lacking. In Oakland, the major thrust has been to decentralization and community oriented schools. As noted in previous reports, this movement, while highly innovative, has produced a school/community feeling that was not receptive to the manner in which the site was selected and the project initiated.

Finally, this overview would be incomplete if the geographic variable was not examined. In a sense, much of what has been mentioned above can be related to the geographic element. Certainly, the fact that the two systems responding most favorably to the project were located in the Southern part of the country cannot be ignored. Salary scales, administration-teacher relations and historical development are all interrelated within the general framework of geographic characteristics. As with the general environment variable, it is difficult to specifically identify the critical ingredient that separates Duval County and San Antonio from Cincinnati and Oakland. The important point, however, is that there was more commonality in response to the Incentives Project on a geographic basis than on the basis of being a teacher model or a parent/teacher model.

The Incentives Project did generate some reactions that were common to all sites and all models. In all sites, the MAC's monitors reported an increased pressure for assistance from the administration. Assistance was generally requested in the area of reading and arithmetic materials as well as additional personnel support. There was no

evidence that more assistance was demanded by those in teacher only models versus those in parent/teacher models. Secondly, there was no reported increase in parental demands on the school. This is particularly significant in that the different reward models were designed to ascertain if the increased cost to the U.S. Office of Education for parent incentives would result in increased parental activity. If parent attendance at school functions is an indication of interest, then it must be assumed that the particular offer of incentives (i.e., maximum of $100 per child) did not work. All our data indicates that a higher percentage of parents in Duval County attended functions than in the other sites. However, this was due in part to the kinds of PTA meetings scheduled.

All of the project sites responded in a similar fashion to the testing procedures of TAC and the monitoring intensity of both the MAC and TAC. The historical narratives substantiate this general conclusion and are filled with comments pertaining to the constant observations, interviews, etc. In general, the initial reaction to the monitor was a concern over evaluation. This concern decreased as the year progressed until the reaction turned to annoyance over the constant and ever present observer(s). Similar reaction was reported from both the control and experimental schools at all sites where the same amount of observational effort occurred at the control and experimental schools.

Finally, a word about the research design. As stated above, identical observations, monitoring, interviews, etc. were conducted at all sites and all schools, thus nullifying the "Hawthorne Effect" to a certain extent. It is impossible to examine two identical schools, but our data indicates that the student body, teacher mix and neighborhood environments were quite similar. Obviously, the process could not take into account the critical variables of the administrative styles, especially of principals, that have played such an important role, but, by and large, the selection process could be deemed a success.

PART II: SUMMARY OF MONITORING AND ASSISTANCE

CONTRACTOR PROJECT ACTIVITIES

School District Selection Process

At the request of the U.S. Office of Education (USOE), Education Turnkey Systems, Inc., the Monitoring and Assistance Contractor (MAC), developed a procedure to expedite the identification of school districts for possible participation in the USOE Incentives Project. The Office of Education (OE) Project Office developed a preliminary list of prospective school districts to be contacted for an expression of interest in being considered as implementation sites for either the Teacher Model or the Teacher/Parent Model. A Site Contact Report Form was developed to provide consistency in the presentation of data related to criteria by which large metropolitan districts would be rated as to whether or not they met USOE experimental design requirements. Appropriate student population in an urban setting was of primary importance. Education Turnkey Systems, Inc. contacted and gathered information on 51 school districts identified by OE as potential participants.

Initial contacts which received positive reactions from school district representatives were followed up with a request for more detailed information in regard to: a) availability of the target population in two elementary schools; b) availability of pupil test data from previous school year; c) anticipated reaction from local teacher union/association; d) status of district's compliance with desegregation guidelines; e) available personnel to staff the project; g) willingness to allow pupil testing, monitoring and observation in the selected schools; and h) other general situations which might preclude a total commitment to the basic intent of the project.

The OE Project Officer reviewed the initial findings from the telephone contacts and identified those districts which were to be contacted again to obtain a "more formal commitment" through possible site visits. This second list was quickly narrowed to those districts which were willing and would be able to participate fully in the planned project.

The OE Project Officer, accompanied by Turnkey personnel, visited these districts to discuss details of the project and to talk with principals and teachers of prospective schools which had been identified by district administrative staff. Upon return from these on-site visits, the OE Project Officer made the final selection of the districts to participate and assigned a specific project model to each district.

Letters of appreciation were prepared by Education Turnkey Systems, Inc. and mailed to the districts which were contacted but not selected for participation in the project. This activity took place from 30 June, 1971 through 23 August, 1971.

Development of Title III Proposal for Funding

The OE Project Officer identified available funds in the ESEA Title III office and requested Education Turnkey Systems, Inc. to develop a model proposal under Section 306 to be utilized by each of the four selected sites. Turnkey staff followed the Title III Proposal Guidelines and developed model proposals to be used for the Teacher Only Model and the Teacher/Parent Model. Budgets were developed and discussed with each of the four sites to clarify total USOE commitment to the project and to identify the specific costs of personnel and services at the individual sites.

MAC conducted orientation sessions and administrative conferences at each project site to acquaint administrative staff and instructional personnel with the

anticipated operational plans and expected levels of local participation and commitment. Continued modification of the Title III model proposal took place as each of the sites revised budgets, identified new costs, and, in one case, switched from the Teacher/Parent Model to the Teacher Only Model. Education Turnkey Systems, Inc. continued to provide management support and technical assistance during the proposal-development process from 24 August, 1971 through 20 December, 1971, at which time each site received notification that its Title III grant award was forthcoming.

The constraints placed upon the funding did affect the nature of the project somewhat. While the Monitoring and Assistance Contractor (MAC) and Testing and Analysis Contractor (TAC) received funds under Section 402, the decision to fund the implementation under ESEA Title III, Section 306, generated a considerable number of minor problems: a) grant award had to await approval or acknowledgement from the respective State Departments of Education, b) the mechanics, although not the substance, of the proposal development process consumed inordinate coordination effort on both Federal and local levels, and c) the credibility of the project in the eyes of district administrators, some teachers, and parents was lessened due to the late arrival of the official grant award document. The extent to which these problems influenced the project outcomes is uncertain.

Development of Teacher and Parent Contracts

Participating sites were required to contract locally with the individual participating teachers and/or parents for the payment of incentives to be made at the end of the school year. Turnkey staff worked with the OE Project Officer to develop a model contract for teachers and a second contract for parents. The contracts were

reviewed by administrative personnel at each site and revisions made to accommodate local administrative philosophies as much as possible without weakening the intent of the project. In several instances Turnkey staff worked directly with Superintendents and school boards to arrive at an agreeable procedure by which the participating teachers could receive an incentive payment while under contract to the district to provide services as a teacher, and without violating the terms of the local association/union agreement.

This contract-development process required seven revisions and modifications before reaching a final agreement which was acceptable to all concerned parties. Turnkey staff then made presentations at all project sites to explain the details of the contracts and the nature of the formula to be used in determining the amount of incentives to be paid (based upon the amount of pupil achievement attained by the end of the school year). This activity continued from 29 July, 1971 through April, 1972, at which time the last teacher contract was signed at the Duval County, Florida site. Parent contract negotiation continued through May, 1972.

Development of Operations Manual for Project Directors

During the month of September, 1971, Turnkey staff developed a Standard Operating Procedures Manual for each of the four district Project Directors. The manual contained a detailed description of the two project models, specific sections on project philosophy and policy, information dissemination procedures, project documentation system, authority and organizational responsibilities, planning and development guidelines, management plan development procedures, description of the incentives delivery system, project budgeting and accounting, implementation procedures, monitoring procedures and schedules, and project termination procedures.

Each Project Director attended a two-day workshop in San Francisco on November 1 and 2, 1971, to receive a complete orientation to the project, review specific duties and responsibilities, and receive thorough instructions on how to use the SOP Manual during the project year.

The SOP Manual was updated on a regular basis during the project year as procedures and policies were modified. Notifications of all changes were sent to each Project Director after they were approved by the OE Project Officer. The SOP Manual helped Turnkey staff to establish and maintain a close working relationship with each Project Director.

Development of Project Information System

Education Turnkey developed, installed, and maintained a project information system for use by the OE Project Officer, district Project Directors, the Testing and Analysis Contractor (TAC) and Turnkey staff throughout the project period. The primary functions of the project information system included documenting the project, providing a "clearinghouse" service for information, and collecting general project data for bimonthly reporting.

The proposed system was modified by the OE Project Officer in concert with TAC and Turnkey staff to avoid duplication of efforts in data collection and reporting. The SOP Manual contained a section on the project information system and described the procedures for completion of monthly reporting requirements at each project site. Specific inputs to the system on a recurring basis included monthly status reports from Project Directors, news clippings, Project Directors' Logs of Significant Events, pupil disciplinary referrals, changes in teacher personnel assignments, site visit reports, on-site monitor reports, visitors' registration forms, and bimonthly reports of TAC

and MAC. Information acquired on a one-time basis and updated only when changes occurred included teachers' daily schedules, inventories of instructional materials, briefing packages, site management plans, and cost-analysis data.

Handling of all data and information was conducted in a manner to insure the confidentiality of all project materials. The project information system was developed during July, 1971, and remained operational throughout the project period.

Preparation and Distribution of Explanatory Materials

Working with the OE Project Officer, Turnkey staff initiated the development of a detailed news release to follow the U.S. Commissioner of Education's announcement of the school districts selected to participate in the Incentives Project. The written material describing the project and details of its planned operation resulted in a much larger document than was originally anticipated. At the request of the OE Project Officer, this was organized into a "Descriptive Pamphlet on the Incentives in Education Project" with printed cover; 2,000 copies were distributed to the project sites and the OE Press Office. Distribution at the local level was mainly to parent, teacher, and community groups; press, radio, and TV groups which expressed an interest in the project were also sent copies. Distribution at the Federal level was in response to Congressional requests and the many letters received from across the nation requesting information about the nature and intent of the project. This activity took place from 1 July, 1971 through 25 October, 1971, with modification occurring in January, 1972.

An adjunct to the development of the Descriptive Pamphlet was a slide presentation also developed by Turnkey staff and modified by the OE Project Officer. Twenty three 2"x2" color slides were made to depict the important aspects of the

Incentives Project and display details of the achievement and payment formulae. The slide presentation was designed specifically to be used in conjunction with the Descriptive Pamphlet which served as the basic presentation outline. The development, and subsequent modifications to the slide program, took place from 30 October, 1971, to February, 1972, as modifications in the payment formulae occurred.

(Subsequent public relations materials were developed at the end of the project period by Turnkey staff. These described the phasing-out activities and the amounts of incentives paid to teachers and parents participating in the project.)

Development of the Incentives Delivery System

The development of the Incentives Delivery System as well as an explanation of its procedures and the payment formulae to school officials, teachers, parents, and local interest groups were the responsibility of Education Turnkey staff. A preliminary payment formula was developed whereby each experimental teacher participating in the project (and the parents of pupils in the teachers' classes at two sites) would be paid a set amount at the end of the school year, based upon pupil achievement. The previous school year's scores in reading and arithmetic would be used to determine the "normal" amount of pupil achievement expected over the school year in grades one through six. The incentives would be paid only if the individual teachers' classes exceeded these expected gains during the project year as indicated by pre and post-test achievement scores. Classroom averages would be used rather than individual pupil achievement scores.

The preliminary payment formula was reviewed by the OE Project Officer, TAC, school district officals, and teachers at the project sites. Expressed concerns regarding homogeneous and heterogeneous groupings and departmentalized classes in the upper

elementary grades were taken into account and resulted in modifications to the payment formula.

The primary modification to the payment formula was the development of "base growth indicators" (BGI's) at three levels (high, middle, and low) for each grade in reading and in arithmetic. Using the TAC data base, the three BGI's for each grade were determined and the BGI level was assigned to each individual teacher according to the average performance of his pupils on pre-tests. Grade-equivalent mean scores were still used rather than individual pupil scores. Each teacher could receive up to $600 per subject (reading and arithmetic only) in incentives based upon calculations made from the post-test scores.

Incentive payments to parents or guardians were calculated from the same formula used for teacher payment. Parents could receive up to $50 per child per subject matter area (reading and arithmetic only) for each child participating in the project. Payments were made directly to parents from the school district in the form of a check.

Education Turnkey staff presented the incentives delivery system and explained its intent and function to administrators and teachers at the local sites. The development and modification of the incentives and delivery system started 1 July, 1971, and was completed in May, 1972.

Development of On-Site Monitoring Plan

Planning discussions with the OE Project Officer for monitoring on-site activities during the project year resulted in Turnkey's responsibility for the development and operation of an on-site monitoring system. Turnkey recruited and hired as monitor a qualified person who already lived within the school district at each project site. The monitors received three days of training at Turnkey facilities (Washington D.C.

and Menlo Park, California) on 13 September, 1971 through 18 September, 1971, in the utilization of the "Parent Interview Forms," "Teacher Interview Forms," and "Classroom Observation Guides". The monitor training involved actual hands on activity with the recording forms which the Staff Consultant had designed from hypotheses which were developed specifically for the Incentives Project. The Turnkey monitors immediately assumed their on-site activities at the conclusion of the training sessions. Reports were mailed by the on-site monitors to Turnkey on a weekly basis and included information about classroom teacher functional activities as a result of the offer of incentives, types of instructional materials utilized, nature of classroom atmosphere, types of student behavior, parental activities of an educational nature conducted at home, amount of parental involvement in school activities, indication of pressure brought to bear on students, and the frequency and nature of complaints and/or favorable comments regarding the project.

The on-site monitors observed classroom activities, conducted teacher and parent interviews, attended teacher and PTA meetings, and met periodically with principals in both the control and experimental schools at each project site. Monitor on-site activities were conducted on a continuing part-time basis from 30 September, 1971, through the end of the school year at each site.

Development of Curriculum Audit

Education Turnkey collected teacher-developed materials at each project site and checked the items on them for possible matches to specific items on the post-test. Commercially available materials and "non item producing" materials, e.g., texts, reading materials, as well as irrelevant materials, were not collected. Turnkey's on-site monitors visited each experimental teacher to request the desired materials.

The materials received were reviewed by Turnkey staff to determine whether or not they appeared likely to introduce any test bias relative to the post-test utilized in the project. Teachers were told only that samples of specific materials generated by them as a result of the offer of incentives were a required input to the project information system.

The curriculum materials reviewed by Turnkey were labeled to indicate any potentially test biasing items and delivered to the TAC. The TAC made a final comparison to post-test items and determined specifically which materials, if any, were considered to have been developed solely for the purpose of helping pupil participants achieve higher scores on the post-test.

The appearance of matching items in materials used in experimental classrooms on a more than random basis was the prime requisite for any disciplinary action by OE.

Development of Cost Analysis Information

In an attempt to gain measures of the degree to which teachers and parents would be willing to invest their time and money in the Incentives Project, Education Turnkey performed a cost analysis of the control and experimental schools at all four sites. This cost analysis was to determine if the availability of incentives to teachers and parents did result in a corresponding increase in the amount and quality of resources made available to the students.

Education Turnkey Systems, Inc. collected data relating to the resources consumed by the students at a representative grade level (6th grade) for both control and experimental student groups at all four sites. Detailed data was gathered for staff and materials cost differentials at the classroom level, and, in Oakland and San Antonio, for materials and imputed value of parents' time devoted to helping their children learn.

This cost information was aggregated and analyzed for both control and experimental students at all four sites. Total per-pupil classroom costs were calculated to determine any differences between the resources consumed in the control and experimental schools.

Development of Bi-Monthly Reports

Every two months throughout the project, Education Turnkey developed a written report describing and analyzing data collected by the on-site monitors during the reporting period. Other information in the bi-monthly reports included a description of Turnkey activities to date, displays of any new project documents, materials relevant to the project produced by individuals not associated with the project, and project related news articles. Specific information presented on individual sites included a chronology of major events, local reactions to the project, and an analysis of the on-site monitor's findings from teacher interviews, classroom observations, and parent interviews.

Each bi-monthly report was distributed at a project review meeting held on a rotating basis at a site selected by the OE Project Officer. These meetings were attended by the TAC, the OE Project Officer, OE Press Office representative, HEW staff, and the Turnkey Project Director.

Availability of On-Call Technical Assistance

Approximately 15 man days were made available to each project site for technical assistance by Turnkey staff on an "as-needed" bases. Specific types of assistance provided to sites included development of management plans, project presentations at school board and community group meetings, negotiation and re-negotiation of teacher

and parent contracts, orientation of administrative and teacher groups to payment formulae, recosting budgets, presentations to teacher associations, documentation system updating, explanation of cost analysis reporting requirements, searching of records, development of letter mail outs from Project Directors, re-negotiation of new models to be implemented (one site only), follow up on administrative complaints regarding procedures of on-site monitors, payment of incentives, and project close-out.

A graphic display of the total numbers of Turnkey staff on-site visits and the nature of the assistance provided will be described in the Final Report.

Development of Incentives Delivery System

In its role as MAC, Education Turnkey Systems, Inc. was responsible for the development and implementation of the system whereby the incentives earned by the teachers and parents were paid. These procedures utilized the following sequence of events. Pupil post-test scores were converted by the TAC to mean grade equivalent gain scores (MGEG) for individual teachers' classrooms. The amount of incentive payment to each teacher was determined by the TAC, based upon the MGEG above the previously determined base gain indicator (BGI) which was assigned to each classroom. A set of printed statements of the dollar amounts earned and payable to teachers or teachers and parents was delivered to each Project Director. The Project Director delivered one copy of the statements to their school district business office as the verified listing and necessary authorization to pay all incentives earned. The Project Directors verified the actual payment by check of all incentives and returned a notated copy of the original incentives earned list to Education Turnkey. A "clean up" effort was conducted by local Project Directors and business managers to deliver any payment checks returned

or not picked up by teachers or parents. Education Turnkey validated the list of payments made at each site and printed certification of payment for the OE Project Officer. Unclaimed incentive payments were placed in escrow for a stated period of time at each site.

PART III: SITE NARRATIVES

Section I: Introduction - Rationale for the Analytical Framework

Education Turnkey Systems, Inc., as the Monitoring and Assistance Contractor, is charged with providing the U.S. Office of Education with an analysis of the change process that occurred at each of the four sites. Although only two incentive based models are being examined, and the same fundamental theory applies to all of the sites, it is most difficult to make cross site comparisons of the "change process." Certainly some similarities have emerged, but care must be taken to examine these in the light of the individual school environments. Ideally, the U.S. Office of Education would like to have selected similar schools in a similar environment for the experiment. The school sites, however, do not exist in a vacuum; hence, any analysis must consider the geographic locations, teachers' associations, administrative structure, and personnel involved with the project.

Furthermore, the MAC analysis is largely dependent upon the field monitor reports for data on the change process. Although ETS, Inc. staff trained all four monitors with identical training and training aides, the different reporting styles simply cannot be aggregated. The monitors have all had experience in education, but they range from an experienced educational administrator pursuing a Ph.D. in Cincinnati, to a housewife with teaching experience in Jacksonville. This should have little impact on the analysis of any individual site as the comparison is made of the experimental and control school process by the same monitor, but it might tend to distort the cross site analysis.

Basically, the general hypothesis of the "Use of Incentives in Education Project" can be conceptualized by examining two models. The first was presented originally in

the January, 1972, Bi-Monthly Report. The second was developed by C.M. Yowell, Jr. in Optimal Rewards in Incentive Systems, as presented in the RAND Report on Performance Contracting.[1]

1. The general hypothesis of the project is that teachers and parents will be stimulated to more effective efforts in assisting low achieving children if they are offered monetary incentives. In short, it is a test of the assumption that a teacher will respond as an "economic man" and change behavior. Thus, by keeping all other variables the same, the project tests the specific relationship between marginal increases in student achievement and marginal increases in teacher salary. The following graph illustrates this:



S = Present Salary
OA = Measured Normal Growth in the School
AB = Increased Growth for Maximum Payment

The purpose of the project is to test if the curve XY does exist; that is, by keeping all other variables the same, the achievement level will increase for A to B with a corresponding increase from S to S + 1200. The task of the MAC is to analyze

[1] James P. Stucker, The Performance Contracting Concept, Appendix: A Critique of the Theory (R-699/2-HEW, Rand, Santa Monica, California), May, 1971, pp. vi-viii.

the change that occurred within the school system which would have caused the increase in performance of the children from OA to OB. Generally, the teaching profession would view that the relationship between salary and achievement would be represented by the line SS'. Thus, student achievement increases would not be viewed as a function of income, as represented by OXY, or even SXY, but rather a function of other variables such as class size, materials, parental support, school environment, etc. Certainly, if the parent/teacher model sites show significant gains and the teacher only sites do not, some general conclusions regarding the different perspectives noted above can be made.

2. The Yowell model of Incentives presents a framework for analysis that is appropriate for this project for he views the incentive relationship to be simply the action of two parties: the principal and the agent. In the case of the Incentives Project, the agent is the teacher or teacher/parents, and the principal is the U.S. Office of Education. The payoff to the principal is exclusively assumed from the action of the agent. "It is further assumed that the basic relationship between the two parties is formed for the benefit of both. Rewards for results coupled with this profit maximizing behavior allow the principal to influence the agent's behavior without, at the same time, restricting the agent's free choice of action."[2] Clearly this is a description of the Incentives Demonstration Project. In order for both the principal and the agent to maximize their utility, or to profit from the agreement, the conditional reward offered to the agent must be greater than the inducement cost of the agent to change behavior. This is a critical concept and provides an important base for the analysis of the change process for variables such as the reward (type and amount) and the cost (both perceived and real) are essential to

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[2] Ibid., p. 8.

the eventual conclusions of the project's impact.

Both conceptual models recognize the importance of the agent's (teacher/parent) perception of the offer of financial bonuses to stimulate educational production. Clearly if the agent sees the bonus as an insult or having no relationship to increased learning skills, then the project could have little impact. On the other hand, if the agent did perceive that the reward was sufficient to overcome the cost, then some change in behavior would occur. The analysis of the change process, in part, focused in on this perception at critical stages of the project. Furthermore, the analysis was directed at the examination of the impact on the total system. In particular, what kinds of stress, if any, were placed on the system to change?

Data Gathering Methodology

Each monitor was supplied with a tape recorder, classroom observation checklists, parent interview checklists, teacher interview checklists, coding system outline and statement of hypotheses. During the training session, the monitors were instructed in the use of their instruments and observation techniques.

The observations were recorded on checklists, interview forms and cassette tapes and sent to the project director weekly. The information was then transferred to the documentation system, enabling the ETS, Inc. Project Director to organize the data into five general categories or codes: classroom observations, teacher observations, and interviews, parent observations and interviews, administrative observations and interviews, and community and general environment observations. The coding system, which provided the basis for systematically organizing the anecdotal data, is enclosed in the appendix of this report. By coding within the general impact areas mentioned above, we were

able to have both a historical record at each site, and a cross reference between sites for specific activities. The following narrative analysis of the "change process" at each site was developed from the monitor reports, ETS staff visits and documentation from the on-site Project Directors. The actual events that substantiate the narrative analysis were reported to the U.S. Office of Education on a bi-monthly basis and are not included here. This is to protect the individuals involved and safeguard the confidentiality of our monitor reports. The narrative account is followed by a section which specifically examines the hypotheses of the project in light of the data collected throughout the total progress.

Section II: Cincinnati, Ohio

There are 46,247 students enrolled in the elementary schools of the Cincinnati School District; the total district includes 79,629 students. At the elementary level, 44% of the student population is black (i.e., 20,386 black students). The data on the two schools involved in the Project shows that Cummins Elementary School (control), with an enrollment of 542, has a black population of 98.52%. Garfield Elementary School (experimental), which has an enrollment of 576 students, has a black population of 93.57%. In 1960, these two schools had a more racially integrated population than exists now. Cummins was then 73% black and Garfield was 78% black. This 12 year trend is typical of the direction that the schools in Cincinnati have been taking.

At the present time, no integration attempts, or studies for integration, have been made because of a pending law suit that has been in the courts since 1963. The present court decision, which dates back to July, 1965, is that there is insufficient evidence to show that the Board of Education had purposely drawn school boundaries to segregate students (i.e., no de jure attempts). In 1966, the Court of Appeals upheld this decision of the lower courts and in 1968, the lower court reaffirmed its decision.

Since the first period of negotiations between the U.S. Office of Education selection team and the Cincinnati School District on August 2, 1971, a number of changes have taken place. First of all, the Superintendent, Dr. Paul Miller, resigned shortly after the initial meetings. Secondly, a Board election in November changed the composition of the Board from a "conservative" majority to a "liberal" majority. Most observers in the Cincinnati area have expressed the notion that if the new Board had had the opportunity to vote on the Incentives Project, the parent/teacher model would have been approved. The third significant event which has affected the Incentives Project was the

unfortunate illness and subsequent hospitalization of the experimental school principal. Since she was involved from the very first visit in August, her perspective and direction were critical to the operation of the Project in Garfield School.

The Cincinnati School District, like many others across the country, has been in a financial pinch. In order to compensate for increased costs without a corresponding increase in revenues, several actions have been taken which have had an impact on the Project. Perhaps the most critical actions have been taken which have had an impact on the Project. Perhaps the most critical areas are in teacher salary and teacher scheduling. Prior to March 1, 1972, the teachers had received no salary increases for two years. A 7% increase was announced in March, but in May, a tax rate increase failed to pass the electorate. To compensate for the financial pinch, all teachers' preparation periods were placed at the end of the day, hence cutting down on the number of teachers needed. The ETS cost analysis of the sixth grade indicated that the average salary at Cummins was $10,130 and at Garfield, $11,310.

The general environment of the two school sites was best described by our monitor in his December 31 Report. He stated,

> "My time this week was spent visiting the homes of children in the Cummins School District. These children, like the children at Garfield, are considered disadvantaged -- they are from low socio-economic homes. However, the living conditions in the Cummins School District are much worse than in Garfield's District. The Garfield District has had some renewal work and public housing made available and the people in that District who live in private homes seem to have more pride in them. In the Cummins District, there has been no work on the part of the Government, either local or federal, to carry on any renewal or public supported types of housing -- the living conditions are deplorable, the houses are physically depleted, children live in crowded quarters with little or no privacy. Minimum health standards are maintained in the Garfield area public housing, but there are no such standards in the Cummins District. I found roaches crawling all over the floors during my interviews, ceilings are falling in, steps are filthy, stench comes from the

halls where there is urine up and down the walls -- it is just a generally discouraging kind of atmosphere for children to grow up in."

Although the home conditions at Garfield appear to be better over all, 61% of the students there are from low income families (i.e., defined as families receiving some form of welfare). At Cummins, 42.5% of the students are from low income families.

* * * *

Initially, the Cincinnati administration and teacher representatives had expressed their desire to be considered as one of the parent/teacher sites. At that time, there was no hint that (1) the Superintendent would soon be resigning, (2) the Board of Education would oppose the parent payment aspect of the Project, or (3) the administration would want to prohibit MAC's and TAC's monitoring efforts at the experimental school until the contract with the U.S. Office of Education was in hand. Hence, both MAC and TAC proceeded on the assumption that Cincinnati was definitely going to participate and briefed the principal and staff of Garfield Elementary School (experimental) and Cummins Elementary School (control).

The first reaction from the control school principal was that this project would help him for it would provide a degree of "competition" that would benefit the children. Furthermore, the school would be delighted to have the extra "bother payment" to use for purchasing new curtains for the auditorium.

At the experimental school site, the principal was full of enthusiasm and had told the MAC representative that the faculty had agreed to participate in this program and "were anxious to do so". She also claimed that the teachers were "coming up with specific plans to individualize programs of instruction in order to maximize performance".

The major concern expressed by the teachers at these early meetings dealt primarily with "equity" of payment for teachers in grades 4, 5, and 6, which are departmentalized and teachers in grades 1, 2, and 3, which are self-contained. It wasn't until after the initial meetings, when MAC's monitor was able to interview the teachers away from the administrative pressure, that the teachers really had an opportunity to express their feelings about the use of incentives. In fact, MAC's representative was not able to begin monitoring the experimental school until the middle of November.

The initial reaction from the control school teachers was similar to those at other sites, however. Our monitor reported,

> "The teachers interviewed this week (Oct. 1-8) without an exception, felt that the incentives program was not going to satisfactorily do the job of improving instruction for the children. They indicated that they felt perhaps the most beneficial way to spend money would be to increase the amount of supervision and quality of supervision given to beginning teachers and probationary teachers; that close supervision and close supportive help, professional guidance for a period of probation and then a kicking out of teachers who didn't make the grade would be more beneficial than trying to pay teachers who didn't make the grade or paying teachers more to do a job better .... One teacher expressed the opinion that most teachers would not be influenced by incentive rewards and that good teachers would do the best they could, no matter how you paid them. Most teachers felt that incentive pay would do very little to change their methods or goals."

The first critical aspect of the Cincinnati project was the Board's rejection of the parent model. Their decision on October 11, 1971, was covered quite extensively on the front page of the Cincinnati Enquirer. The article stated, in part, that, "Board members today voted three to two against accepting $150,000 in federal money for the pay proposal. The Board members voted unanimously to accept that portion of the grant which would provide incentives to teachers if it could be obtained.... The Board also adopted a resolution to protest the Office of Education's use of federal funds to pay parents for their children's good grades."

It is interesting to note the individual reaction of the Board members for it indicates the general philosophy of the administration of the Cincinnati system at that time. Mrs. Mary Schloss: "Incentives pay for teachers is a step toward merit pay, which is a good idea, but I oppose paying parents. I think it is an insult." Mrs. Virginia Griffin: "Paying parents is a way of saying the parents aren't doing their jobs. It assumes parents will respond to monetary stimulation rather than the normal instincts of love and protection for their children." Ronald Temple: "I have strong reservations about the parent incentive, but I'm willing to go along with the proposal. This is only an experiment. It won't be firmly implanted." Finally, the comment of Mr. Lindberg, Chairman of the Board: "I personally find a great objection to providing incentive payments to parents. It is not a proper part of the educational scheme. I believe there is some place where you have to draw the line even on receiving federal funds. Teachers receiving merit pay is a different thing and should be encouraged."

Both MAC and TAC monitoring efforts were confined to the control school because the Cincinnati Administrative staff felt that monitoring the experimental school could not go on until the school district actually received the grant from the U.S. Office of Education. A letter from our monitor dated November 7, 1971, illustrates the condition:

> "The principal, the director, and his associates within the division of Program Planning and Research and Design, have indicated to me as late as Friday, November 5, 1971, that no contact should be made with the experimental school until contracts are received and negotiated. Only a degree of openness has permitted me to proceed to the degree that I have at the control school."

This condition prevailed until the ETS, Inc. Project Director visited the site. After separate conferences with the Director of the Division of Program Planning and Research and Design, and the principal of the experimental school, it was agreed that our monitor,

as well as PLANAR's team, could begin work even though Cincinnati had not received official notification of the project. Obviously, the delay has limited our data collecting.

In the interim, the control school faculty was interviewed and observed. The following monitor report shows the general attitudes expressed by the Cummins School faculty. It is interesting to note here that these comments were made prior to the intensive monitoring, interviewing, observations, etc. of PLANAR. The following excerpts come from the monitor report of November 2, 1971.

> "One teacher at the control school, who has been here for 25 years, indicated that he likes the project and thinks it is a sound idea to pay teachers for their output or effectiveness rather than for the years of experience or the number of degrees they have. He felt that many teachers with Masters Degrees were less effective than some teachers with less education and felt that they should not be paid more just because of their degrees. Some teachers felt that the Incentives Project could be a way of building into a merit pay type of project or paying for the effectiveness of a teacher. They felt it would be good to pay good teachers some extra amount above their salary for especially good work. On the whole, most teachers felt that the Incentives Project would not make any significant improvement in the product coming out of the schools. They felt that teachers would teach as they usually do and some would find a way to get the incentive pay without putting in any special efforts to improving instruction (i.e., they would find some "tricks of the trade" to make the money, but wouldn't really do a more effective job in terms of educating students)."

> "One of the teachers indicated that she felt the curriculum of educational opportunities might become unbalanced because of this project. People may neglect other things in the experiences of children and emphasize math and reading too seriously. If this idea should catch on, there could be serious imbalances in the students' curriculum."

> "Some of the teachers were disturbed because they didn't understand how they were being viewed as teachers by the people who designed the project. They wondered if they were seen as having not done their jobs; or as reacting to incentive pay as one might react to a bribe; or as having done a good job using their energies trying to be good teachers. Were they viewed as people who really do have an interest in students, but who may, through this project take time out to evaluate what they have really done or accomplished and maybe change occupations if they are not successful?"

The types of activity noted at the control school reflect what might be considered a

typical mix of good and bad teaching. One teacher had two different group activities going on at the same time: a small group reading with the teacher and another group cutting and pasting little things that related to the story being read. She would move from the reading group to the activity group and kept everything well organized. Another second grade teacher had her children reading and using charts to read to each other in groups. Others were working at their seats writing and working in workbooks. A third second grade teacher has a class in which part of the students are involved in a federally funded reading program. Part of her children leave during the class period for instruction from a reading resource teacher. The reading teacher reinforces the various reading skills that are being taught in the regular classroom. New materials are introduced to the children by the resource teacher and new ways are implemented to encourage and motivate them to enjoy their task of reading. These children are a year to a year and a half behind the rest of their class. Some observations of a fourth grade math class found the teacher speaking to the total class. In some of his classes, the monitor reports student interest, in others, "about half of the class did not seem to be understanding the lesson".

Certainly, there is a great deal of evidence from our monitor reports that the control faculty was responding early in the project to the challenge of competition noted earlier. The monitor report of November 19, 1971, stated,

> "They accepted the experiment as a challenge saying that Cummins would outdo the experimental school even though they weren't being paid. Lately some of the teachers, all of whom are experienced teachers and have taught at Cummins for a number of years, indicated that they did not feel that pay would create a difference between the kinds of experiences their children would have and those experiences of the other children. They indicated directly that they have always done their very best and have worked with the children to get the most from their abilities and that they would take it as a challenge to show that they could produce at Cummins equal to or better than at Garfield."

However, on closer inspection, the teachers report that they had not yet done anything differently and were not then (November) planning any special methods because of the project. The monitor reported, "It is interesting that we have been told that these teachers will be as effective as the experimental teachers, but I have not observed that they have tried any harder to achieve more with the children yet."

The situation in the experimental school during the early months was really unknown due to Cincinnati's refusal to allow our monitor in the school until November 18. Our monitor did report an interesting observation that reflects on the administrative style at Garfield. He reported,

> "Mrs. Mangrum indicated that she didn't want me in the building and didn't want me interviewing teachers or talking to parents or conducting any other kind of activity until the teachers contracts had been negotiated. Up until today, I had been led to believe that this was the crucial thing for the experimental school. In the meeting with Mrs. Mangrum, I found that she had been doing some homework. She had developed and duplicated an organizational chart which indicated the school's relationship and personnel relationships with the U.S. Office of Education. The two research groups contracted (MAC and TAC) were included as well as many of the personnel involved in the research groups. She had also duplicated a page of procedures and information about the payment plan, structure of grade level meetings, goals and objectives for the schools, techniques and activities to be used, structures for reading and math -- all this was for the people involved in the Incentives Project. It appears now that the principal has had an opportunity to work with the teachers and is now open and ready for the monitoring to take place. She indicated to us that she wished we had been there to see the kind of responses which the project aroused in the school. At the same time, she had made it impossible for us to be there to see the things she said she wished we could have seen. It seems that what she really wanted to do was to organize her teachers with programs for instruction, etc., and prepare them to work with the project before she would let us come in and make observations."

The in depth observation at Garfield did not start until the first week in December. A variety of teaching styles and classroom atmospheres were reported ranging from chaotic conditions to highly structured lecture type situations. One classroom observation is worth noting at this time for comparison with the same classroom at the end of the year.

The monitor reported, "It seemed somewhat repressive to me... the walls were mostly bare with a few poorly made charts relating to math problems. I retumed the next day, hoping to see more activity in the room. The children were working on an assignment... all on the same problem, the same page, etc., of the same math book. There was not an ability grouping among them and all were working individually."

As in other sites, the building principal plays an extremely important role in receptivity to new ideas, monitoring activity and developing ways of relating the total school to the project. There has been absolutely no effort on the part of the experimental school principal to involve parents. Garfield School has no PTA, no mothers' clubs or any other structured vehicle to involve parents. Although the principal claims to be in contact with parents, our monitor reports that her contacts are with community helpers only. None of these helpers are parents of children enrolled in the school. In addition, no efforts were made to go over the test results and explain them. The Project Director reported that the principal felt that her teachers were "test wise" and needed no interpretation.

At Cummins School (control) a Mothers' Club has been organized and seems successful when the homeroom mother makes the effort. Even with this effort, our early results of parent interviews indicate that no consistent pattern of involvement emerges.

The monitor further reported that for the most part, parents are unaware of the many activities that are taking place in the schools. Even with the wide newspaper coverage, most were unaware of the Incentives Project until explained by MAC's monitor. Special meetings with parents regarding the project have not been held at either school. When administrators speak of parents' input, they are speaking about parents who are around the school as aides or Mothers' Club members. The project had not been used as

a stimulus for any kind of on going active parent groups or PTA. Certainly the project coordinator in the experimental school has not called any meetings regarding the project.

One parent (experimental) said the school had too many outside activities such as field trips, movies, etc. The monitor reported, "She is planning to move to another area where there would be more "basic" type instruction available such as reading, writing, and arithmetic. She says it is alright with the disadvantaged children from ghettoes, etc., but that she provides her child with these experiences and she needs education in the basic skills in school."

ETS, Inc.'s monitor reports halfway through the academic year reported little change from the activities at the start of the school year. Even the parent involvement noted before had dwindled at Cummins School due to the fact that the two parent leaders had moved away. At an Open House meeting at Garfield in February, about twelve parents attended to discuss the Incentives Project. Our monitor added, "Both principals think they have "open schools" -- that parents are free to come in anytime to visit the classrooms with no more announcement than telling the office that they are there." However, there is little evidence that the parents, in fact, did visit the school and classrooms on an informal basis.

The monitoring reports for February and March indicated that both the control school teachers and experimental teachers are attempting to try a variety of techniques to assist the children. It is not at all clear that their techniques are being stimulated by the Incentives Project. Although the teachers deny that the project has an effect on them, the following indicates that it may:

> "She says she hates to think that incentives are making her a better teacher; she would like the money, but also would like to think she has been trying all along... She doesn't think the change in her is because of the offer of money."

On the other hand, the constant exposure to our monitor ("you really are getting to be a regular around here," or "You are almost like the furniture," are typical teacher comments about our monitor), press coverage, TV photographers, and state department officials must have an important impact. One indication of the concern about the Incentives Project was reported in the February 5, 1972, monitor report:

> "A kind of ownership of the Incentives Project in the experimental school is being noticed among the teachers. Recently there have been several newspaper reports of various experimental programs over the country sponsored by OEO which have failed, in the Director's opinion. When these reports are made, there is a connection made between them and the Incentives Project. Many of the teachers and the principal have talked with me about their feelings of anger with the reporters for criticizing "their" program. They object to statements that it is not successful, or implications that it isn't, just because the other programs failed. They do believe it will be successful and they resent reporters saying, at this point, that it is not a success."

The announcement of pre-test results did not generate much reaction at the Cincinnati site. The Project Director reported to us that the control school principal did not distribute the results of tests to the teachers and that the experimental school principal distributed the test results with little explanation. Our monitor reported, "The teachers were not very impressed by the scores and got very little meaning from them. They said they didn't see the scores as being beneficial to them in that many of the children they had placed in one group and recommended to be tested by a certain test were changed and placed in another room to take another test." Further, the monitor reported, "Considering these feelings of the school personnel, it is my opinion that the use of these tests has made very little impact on any activities or changes within the classrooms because of the project."

In February, the experimental school principal had to leave the school due to illness and returned only briefly toward the end of the year. This has had a decided

impact on the project and the operations of the school. There has been a noticeable increase in teacher absenteeism. The monitor reports suggest that there appears to be a feeling of apathy developing among teachers and a feeling of frustration because of "the lack of student control and a consensus among teachers as to their direction. Since her departure, the school began to become disorganized and teachers have a feeling of ambiguity and lack of direction for their tasks. Teachers started to feel that they should take their sick days because they really needed them."

In his March 11, 1972, report our monitor noted the problem developing at Garfield. He wrote,

> "I spent time this week observing at Garfield. A sixth grade teacher on the third floor who generally has the control responsibility for that floor was out for four days. Another teacher was out on Monday. Both of them have assumed in an unwritten manner, control of students on the third floor. With the principal out, this building is taking on the atmosphere one might see at the end of the school year in June. That is, there is much disorganization and apathy on the part of the teachers, and frustration among them and the students. The halls are dirty, and objects are even being thrown out of windows (Monday a chair was thrown from a third floor window). Students are running from room to room and interrupting the on-going classes. The doors on the third floor were locked each time I tried to go in for observations and I had to knock to get in. Children continued to interrupt the classes in the rooms where I was observing."

At Garfield, there have been extra meetings this year, directly as a result of the Incentives Project. There has also been an increase in the number of bulletins circulating around the building to keep the staff informed about various stages of the project. The bulletins have focused in on the more technical aspects of the project. The bulletins have focused in on the more technical aspects of the project more so than on encouraging better use of time or different ways of working with children.

Other reactions to the project are intensifying as the post-tests get nearer. For example, teacher made tests have increased at the experimental school. The teachers

apparently are designing tests that would be similar to the kind of tests which will be administered at the end of this year. Tests are being given which require the child to transfer the answer from one sheet to another (i.e., the test item on one sheet and answers on another).

At both schools, the monitor has noted that he sees a marked increase in space devoted to the encouragement of the student in reading and math. For example, in the control school, one teacher developed a bulletin board encouraging good reading habits, another has constructed a "math mountain" where the names of children are built in a mountain as they present good papers in math.

At the same time, an increase has been reported in displeasure with the project. In particular, the teachers (both schools) are becoming very tired of the project now. When the monitors come in in large numbers, as they do with PLANAR's design, it tends to disrupt the classes and bothers the teachers. The criticism has not died down about the work of PLANAR. Teachers at both schools see these interviewers as intentionally selecting the "worst" or most "difficult" pupils in the rooms for their interviews.

Even the ETS monitor, who has had excellent rapport with teachers, has started to comment on a deteriorating relationship. He reported, "I am beginning to receive joking comments about my frequent visits and my constant observations. I think that the reading from these things is that the teachers are beginning to become a little annoyed with being observed so much." In fact, he had some difficulty in collecting materials for the curriculum audit. One teacher commented, "I made the material for the children, not for Washington."

The most significant event in Cincinnati was the untimely illness of the experimental school principal. She was absent from the school for approximately the second half of

the school year. Prior to her departure, our monitor was reporting on some teacher activity which seemed to be stimulated by the Incentives Project. After her departure, however, the general atmosphere of the school changed and conditions appeared to deteriorate. Certainly, by the end of the year, the educational environment at the experimental school had altered enough to upset the experimental design. Hence, any total analysis of the project in Cincinnati must take into consideration the different school environment at the beginning and end of the academic year.

In short, the event has two important ramifications for analysis. The first is that the most critical variable at the experimental school was the building principal. Her style of administration and influence on the faculty affected their receptivity to the project and stimulated some change in their activity. Secondly, the post-test results must be analyzed in the light of an "abnormal" school situation. This might tend to skew the results in Cincinnati for the conditions at the control school and experimental school were quite different during the post-test time period.

Section III: Duval County, Florida

The total population of Duval County, Florida (Jacksonville) is approximately 600,000, with a public school enrollment of 118,800. Of that enrollment, 73% are white and 27% are black. The elementary school statistics are similar, with a reported 70% white and 30% black enrollment. At the project site, both schools are virtually 100% black and have been that way for a number of years. Next year (1972-73 school year), both George Washington Carver Elementary School (control) and Smart Pope Livingston Elementary School (experimental) will become integrated sixth grade centers. As the historical narrative will indicate, this change has had an important effect on the renovation of the schools and on the efforts of teachers. The general salary scale for teachers ranges from $6,800 to $12,000. This has not substantially changed since 1968 and indications are that there will be less than a cost of living increase in 1972-73. Our cost analysis of the sixth grades showed that the average salary of those teachers at Livingston was $9,525, while at Carver (control) the sixth grade teachers had an average salary of $8,433. The per pupil expenditure for the county is $712; $679 is from local revenue and $43 is from federal and state funds.

Generally, the environment around the control school could be described as "better" than the neighborhood adjacent to the experimental school. At Smart Pope Livingston (experimental), 61% of the student body comes from low income families (defined as receiving some form of welfare assistance). This school, of 860 students, feeds 801 free lunches each day. Hence, 93% of the children qualify for the free lunch program. At Carver (control), 35% of the children come from low income families and 579 out of the 768 students are given free lunches (75%).

The school district has been involved in a number of federal projects lately, which

has accustomed the administration to the testing and analysis procedures necessary. In particular, the original project director had previously worked with staff from both the TAC and the MAC on the O.E.O. Performance Contracting Project. This was an important contributing factor to the ease with which the project was initiated.

Three of the most critical variables at the Duval County site are: 1) the recent integration of faculty members; 2) administrative styles of the principals; and 3) changes for the 1972-73 school year. Until last year, generally only black teachers taught black children. The integration plan required that all schools integrate their faculties on a racial percentage similar to the racial mix of the total population. As a result, new white teachers were assigned to both Carver and Livingston schools. Their uneasy feelings with the new student body was carried over to the Incentives Project. As a result, early negative reactions to the project often stemmed from the uncertainty expressed by white teachers working with black children. As the year progressed, this condition changed and has resulted in a generally favorable attitude toward the project and greater rapport with the children.

Secondly, the administrative styles are so completely different at the two schools, that any historical account of the project must be considered in light of the operations of the two principals. The principal at the control school prefers to work through the school secretary and curriculum coordinator rather than directly with his staff and students. He has been receptive to the project, but has not used it to stimulate activity within the faculty. The principal of the experimental school, on the other hand, has a dominant position at the school. As the historical narrative indicates she has been very receptive to the project and has used it as a tool to draw attention to the school and her efforts.

The third important variable that must be considered is that both the control and experimental schools will be changed next year from all black elementary schools to integrated sixth grade centers. This has meant, particularly in the last months of the school year, constant interruptions for painting and repairs as well as investigations by white parents and children who will be in the Livingston and Carver attendance areas. Hence, increasing pressure from being "on display" in the midst of change might have an effect on the eventual achievement level gains.

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A great deal of care was taken at the Duval County, Florida site to involve all parties prior to the opening of school, including both principals, the elementary area director, the supervisor of elementary education and president of the Duval County Teachers Association. All appeared to be in agreement and pledged to give the project its necessary support. Subsequent articles in the Duval County Newsletter, local TV shows and articles in the Florida Times-Union substantiated this. Unlike the other three sites, the original Project Director had already been selected by the opening of school in September. Hence, a great deal of the initial work with the teachers in both the Control and Experimental schools was done by the on-site Director. He spoke with the faculty at Smart Pope Livingston on August 31, 1971, and at George Washington Carver on September 2.

The initial reaction from the teachers in Duval County was similar to comments heard at other sites. For example, our monitor, on October 8, reported an interview with a teacher who had been at the experimental school since 1954.

> "She feels that this type of program would just be a way to get rid of teachers -- she's very much opposed to it. She will not change her methods of instruction at all. Many of the teachers feel the project is bad because it will divide the faculty. At this school there is also a division between whites and blacks on the faculty, though I am not sure that the problem with the faculty is caused by the project or by the changing of the teachers that has been going on there. I have talked with many teachers who don't want to have anything to do with the project."

Another expressed it in the October 29, 1971, report in the following way:

> "She plans to do everything she can, but will continue to teach the way she has before. She thinks it will get some teachers to work harder than they ordinarily would. I find that many of the teachers say they plan to do all they can, but they also said they always do that. So, it seems that while they are accepting the project, they aren't really very enthusiastic about it."

The Project Director's intial comment was,

> "The overall faculty reaction to the project has been good. A few faculty members at both sites have expressed apprehension to the Project Director and the monitor about the concept of incentive pay for teachers and the amount of classroom monitoring that is involved. It is anticipated that as the year progresses much of the anxiety will be dispelled."

Throughout October and November, the general comments at Livingston were directed at the school principal and her style of "handling" the faculty. As was described in the general environment section, a change in teaching staff as a result of faculty integration attempts had a great deal to do with this. The interesting fact, however, is that initially the teachers were having problems teaching black students. This changed radically as the year progressed and a real reversal of attitude was reported by our monitor in her April report. It is not at all clear that the Incentives Project had much to do with this change. Certainly, our monitor reports do not indicate this.

The reaction to the pre-test results did indicate some impact. The Project Director's report stated,

> "The overall reaction to the test results was good. Several teachers expressed concern about having to triple what had taken place in the past in order to receive a minimum payment."

The monitor report stated,

> "The Project Director gave scores out to teachers on Monday and it has generated a lot of enthusiasm. Since then, some of the teachers have actually invited me to come in to see what they are doing. They do not like, however, not knowing what areas the scores represented. There is no indication what areas the kids are weak in and the teachers would like to know this information. One teacher complained because he had a slow class and would have to bring his class up higher than others. Since the scores, however, there has been a new attitude of enthusiasm toward the project, and I hope it will carry on."

The first indication that parents were aware of the project came on November 26. Usually, the monitor reported that she had to tell the parents about the project, herself,

when she visited them. She went on to say that,

> "There is more awareness of what is going on in the school now. This is a result of report cards. I can get more definite attitudes and answers to my questions now. One parent even said that her child was doing better in reading and she felt it could have been a result of the Incentives Project -- I was shocked at this statement since very few parents have even been aware of the project, much less feeling it was having an effect on their children."

Generally, the reaction of parents throughout the whole project has been one of support in hopes that their children would improve because of it. Although most of them have little contact with the schools, they generally have expressed favorable attitudes toward the schools.

The principal at Smart Pope Livingston was quoted in the Florida Times-Union on January 6, 1972, as saying,

> "When I get there at 7:00 a.m., they (teachers) are there waiting for me... It (project) seems to provide a little extra incentive to go the extra mile.... I can hardly wait to see the results."

Certainly some evidence began to appear in the monitor reports about halfway through the year, indicating that teachers at the experimental school were beginning to increase the tempo of their activities. One teacher, in particular, decided that "because of the project, she would give her students extra tutoring after school." She does stay after school to do so. This may have encouraged other teachers to do the same thing so her class wouldn't outshine theirs. This was the first definitive and positive occurrence caused by the project.

Even in the control school, some evidence of increased activity was observed. In January, the monitor's report stated,

> "It was really fantastic to see the new materials I ran into in the first grade department. The first grade teachers meet together and talk about what they can do to help their children. They spend two or two and a half hours

> a day working or planning related things for their classes. They are constantly doing things to help pull the unit together. Their classes are not grouped according to ability, so they have very similar groups and can put their heads together to think up ideas which will help the children."

Another example of the "change process" noted were the incidents of formal testing similar in format to PLANAR's tests.

> "One teacher at Livingston has a more formal testing atmosphere for her class than what is ordinarily done at this testing period. She said she was trying to accustom the children to taking tests in a formal atmosphere so they would, hopefully, be more at ease and do well on the PLANAR test in April. The teacher was testing her children at very much the same level that they would be tested at in April. When she gets the results of these tests, she will go over and stress the things the children were weak on."

The curriculum coordinator said that the first and second grade departments had asked for tests that had been used at one time or another so they could get the kids geared up for taking tests. She is sure they are doing this because of the project and because they know the children will be tested again.

On three different weekly reports, our monitor commented on the increased use of planning time by the teachers. Comments such as, "they feel they are doing more planning than last year, they are also taking extra work home which they didn't remember doing before," are indications of this increased tempo of teacher preparations. In addition, it was reported that, "lately there has been a great increase in activity of teachers during their planning period. They are doing such things as tutoring the children who are not doing as well as they could, or cleaning up their rooms, or just reading and working on plans. This is especially evident at Livingston and the most noticeable use of time by teachers is to help their problem children."

Besides increased activity in planning and testing, our monitor reports during the mid-year indicated that pupils' classroom activities had been altered. More individualized instruction had been observed, as well as increased peer tutoring.

Attitudes began to change about the project during this interim period, (between tests and contract time) as well as an increase in planning and testing. One teacher, at the experimental school, who had been opposed to the project, stated that over the last six months her attitude had changed and, "she feels it is good because it does not apply a definite pressure on the teachers. She is using rewards now which she has never done before and is also encouraging her students to use the library." A further notation from the monitor in her February 5, 1972 report, stated,

> "Teachers are using everything they can get their hands on in the way of materials, etc. They have been borrowing things when necessary and even making things themselves in order to help the kids learn. They are buying more things on their own and doing many things which they hope will enhance the achievement of their students."

Shortly after the teacher contract provisions were announced, the teachers began to increase their activities and demands on the administration for more supportive services.

At Carver (control) School, the curriculum coordinator stated that the third grade department was regrouping in reading because they felt as though the present grouping was not doing very much for the children. She believes that this regrouping of the third grade was done specifically because of the Incentives Project.

At Livingston School (experimental), our monitor reports,

> "There was a lot of enthusiasm at Livingston after the teachers were given the forms showing how much they would have to bring their students up. One teacher said she was glad, that now she knew where she would have to go! Even when the announcement was made that the last test would be given on May 10, some of the teachers were glad because they still would have more time. You could real ly see that they were excited about the idea of getting the money and seemed to like having a specific goal to meet. Some of the 6th grade teachers were more concerned than the others because they would have to bring their students up the most. They asked many questions and wer e worried about the prospects facing them, since they would have to bring their classes up at least one grade level in both reading and math. On the other hand, however, most of the teachers were happy because they could see the bonus in front of them."

The change in school population for the 1972-73 school year has an important effect on the project. First of all, the control school teachers began to question the way in which the $2,000 "bother payment" was going to be made since many were not going to be back at Carver. In particular, the teachers asked if the money could be split up between them so they could use it on their own classes for materials, etc. next year. The principal, however, was concerned that the money remain at Carver.

Secondly, both schools have gone through major renovations in preparing for integrated student body. The renovations have caused some discomfort and disruption of normal classroom activity. Also, white parents have been visiting the school to see the facilities and this has tended to interrupt the class activities. All of these interruptions and the MAC and TAC monitoring together have constituted a real problem for the teachers. Our monitor report on April 8, 1972, expressed the feeling this way,

> "The teachers expressed a feeling that they will be glad when next week gets here and the painters will be gone. They realize that there is not much time before the kids will be tested and this pressure is beginning to be felt."

Between the period of the contract signing and post-tests,a great deal of activity was noted by our monitor. The following accounts indicate the degree of activity:

> "There is more testing now. The teachers seem to be more concerned with the grade levels their children are on, and how much they need to improve them."

> "At both schools, when teachers find students who are weak in certain areas, they try to work out a system or rearrange the grouping so they can do more work with the individual students who need special assistance."

> "Rewards are being used quite often, as before. They are more in the way of extra privileges and activities which are related to the subjects, rather than candy or that kind of reward."

> "I have also noticed that some of the teachers at Livingston have begun to encourage the children to help each other. This happens often in cases where one student finishes an assignment before the others, he will be asked by the teacher to help other children."

"I have seen an increase in enthusiasm in reading and math among the students. They seem to be very excited and interested in learning the material. They really seem to want to do well and show their teachers that they can do well. This is particularly true in the class which scored so low they could not be included in the range of test scores. The entire atmosphere of this class has changed, including the attitude of the teacher, since passing out the test scores. She has revamped both her math and reading programs; the kids are actually reading now. She has asked for more help from the reading resource teacher, who has been helping as much as possible. There are many other instances where it seems that the attitudes of both teacher and children are changing and wanting to do more."

"The reading resource teacher at Livingston says that all the teachers have been coming to her to order new resource materials and want her to come to their rooms to have her help them with their reading classes. She is busy preparing more materials for the teachers to use."

One last item should be considered in looking at the historical development in Duval County, and that is the case of the pregnant teacher. It is important only in that the Incentives Project was brought into the picture. According to district policy, a woman in her fourth month of pregnancy must stop teaching. One of the teachers at Smart Pope Livingston had reached that point, was dismissed by the principal and put on maternity leave. She took the case to court and the Florida Times-Union of April 21, 1972, reported the following,

"She said her request to continue teaching to the end of the school year was refused and it is costing her a salary plus a possible bonus up to $1200 because of her participation in 'the teacher incentive program' sponsored by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, (HEW)."

"The bonus will depend on the performance of her assigned students in reading and mathematics. On the 19th of April, the Court ruled that the teacher could go back to the classroom and to continue for the remainder of the school year."

Tentative Conclusions

Clearly the monitoring reports at the Duval County, Florida site have indicated a substantial change at both schools this year. In particular, the teachers at the experimental

school have been involved in more planning, individualized tutoring, structure testing, and rewarding good achievements. In particular, the attitude change of the teachers from the original notification to the time just prior to the post-test when this report was prepared, has been quite remarkable; not only have the teachers expressed (to our monitor) the changing perspective of the Incentives Project, but they also seem to have been able to respond more to the needs of their children. This latter response may not have been a result of the Incentives Project. At any rate, the offer of financial "bonuses" seems to have had a greater impact in Duval County than any other location. This may be due to a number of factors.

1) All administrative and union personnel have given the project encouragement and support.
2) The salary scale at Duval County is low compared to others, hence, the percentage increase of possible bonus.
3) A great deal of publicity in the newspapers, Duval County school releases, and over local television shows have all been favorable.

Interestingly enough, all of these changes have occurred within the framework of some real obstacles, such as recent busing problems, integration moves, and renovation of both of the schools.

Section IV Oakland, California

The Oakland Unified School District serves 61,586 students in a city of approximately 357,000 people. The majority of the student population comes from "minority" groups: 58.8% are black, 8.4% Spanish surname, 5.1% oriental, 0.6 American Indian, 0.9% are other non-whites, and 26.2% are white. The district is surrounded by other communities that have a white majority; Berkeley to the North and San Leandro to the South. In 1970, Dr. Marcus Foster was selected as the superintendent of the schools after a lengthy search. Since that time, the district has taken on a new direction and perspective that has a direct bearing on the Incentives Project.

Dr. Foster's particular push in Oakland has been to develop a decentralized school system that would be responsive to the individual school community needs. As part of his condition for employment in Oakland, he insisted on a study indicating how the school district could be decentralized. The Price-Waterhouse Study, conducted in 1970, broke the District down into three regions which were roughly similar in size. The 1971-72 school year was the first year that the decentralized administration organization went into effect. The second step taken by Dr. Foster was to develop a Master Plan Citizens' Committee at each school site. Each committee is composed of parents, community people, and administrators. The net result of these two actions has been the growth of a community attitude about the schools that in some ways conflicted with the operations of the Incentives Project. Throughout the entire project, the major criticism voiced by teachers and parents, at both the control and experimental schools, has been that the school community was not consulted first.

The particular schools in the project, Longfellow Elementary School (experimental)

and Santa Fe Elementary School (control), have the following ethnic breakdown: Longfellow has a population of 562 students and 17 teachers; 94% are black, 1% American Indian, 1% Oriental, 2% Spanish surname, and 3% other non-white. Santa Fe has a student population of 770 students and a faculty of 28 teachers. Of the student body, 98% are black, .5% Spanish surname, .5% Oriental, .1% American Indian, and 1% other non-white.

Even though the two school communities are adjacent to each other, and are somewhat similar as the above data indicates, there are some distinguishing differences. First, Santa Fe is somewhat larger than Longfellow. Secondly, the neighborhood surrounding the control school appears to be slightly higher in the socio-economic strata than the experimental school. Thirdly, our cost analysis indicates that the average salary for the one grade analyzed (6th grade) is slightly higher at Longfellow ($11,837) than at Santa Fe ($11,667). Fourth, the schools fall into different administrative districts with the experimental school located in Mr. Reynolds district, while the control school is located in Mr. Croce's district. Finally, it should be noted that the Project Director's office was located adjacent to the principal's office at Longfellow School. This last fact may be a critical one in examining the eventual production outcome in the Oakland project.

* * * *

The initial meeting with the Longfellow staff was a surprise to the faculty. Even at this juncture, opposition was stated concerning "the appropriateness" of the use of monetary incentives to encourage teachers to increase student learning. The general concensus, however, was to proceed with the project and "give it a chance."

At Washington Elementary School (the initial choice for the control school), ETS, Inc.'s Project Director met with the school principal. He assured us that the faculty would be willing to participate in this project, particularly since the school would receive approximately $2,000 from the school district as a "bother payment" at the completion of the year. He further indicated that there was no need, at this time, for further explanation, either on the part of the MAC or the administration in Oakland to explain the project to the teachers. This proved to be an unfortunate decision.

On October 5, the Superintendent of Oakland received a telegram from the majority of the faculty at Washington School indicating that they did not want to be a part of the Project. This came as a complete shock to all concerned for the MAC monitor had already been introduced to the faculty and there were no reported indications of dissatisfaction. In hindsight, it appears that the reason for Washington School's withdrawal from the project was a breakdown in communications.

A meeting with representatives of PLANAR and ETS, Inc. and Oakland Unified School District ensued. After consulting the the USOE Project Director, Santa Fe Elementary School appeared to be the next best alternative. On October 7, 1971, representatives of PLANAR, Oakland, and ETS met with the faculty there. The initial reaction of the Santa Fe faculty was very similar to the initial reaction of teachers at Longfellow. Generally, the comments were divided among those who said that, "This is an interesting thing, let's give it a chance," and those who said, "This is an insult and I don't like the idea of having to pay teachers a bonus for what they are already doing." Since PLANAR had already begun the precedures for testing, both MAC and TAC insisted on a quick decision. The following day, the principal indicated that the "consensus of the faculty was that they would agree to be the control school."

On October 12, 1971, the Oakland Board of Education decided to take on the Incentives Project. The one dissenting voice on the Board made a number of comments that reflect many of the concerns expressed by those who opposed the incentive payment concept. Excerpts from his statement follow:

> "While I appreciate that Oakland was one of the four cities selected for this project, I feel that we have a responsibility to determine whether or not these programs are the kind of things to which we should subject our children. I can't help getting the impression that the Office of Education was just sitting around saying, 'Gosh, the things we have been doing just aren't working--what else can we try?' And then, someone popped up with the idea of paying parents to get their kids to go to school. So they developed a program just because it had never been tried, and now are trying to test it.
>
> "I think there are several things about the program which we should examine carefully. First, is the program to pay bonuses to teachers for what their salaries already pay? The second is paying parents whose child is in the class, whether or not their particular child is one who achieves greater gains. This means that the parents who work verydiligently with their children receive the same amount of money as the parents who don't do anything. I think it is another case of giving people something for nothing and I think it is ridiculous.
>
> "Another serious problem is regarding the child who is unable to achieve in the classroom. The report says there will be no undue pressure on these children, but my reaction to that is baloney. There will be a great deal of pressure put on the children by the teachers and the parents to get the grade equivalent up. I can see an awful lot of pressure being put on the children by everyone and this will detract from the study of other subjects like social studies, physical education, etc. I can see, too, a tremendous amount of pressure being put on the child by a parent who all of a sudden sees a good way to earn an extra $100. I am not sure this is what we should be doing in education, and it bothers me! It particularly bothers me in the situation of the child with little ability who is actually not able to succeed.
>
> "There are some other things about the program which also concern me. In essence what we are doing with the incentives for parents is paying them to be parents and yet doing nothing to show them how to do a good job. I really think the focus of education should be on the child and yet, this program is focusing on parents.
>
> "There is also no indication of where this program will lead us in the future. I imagine there is some idea of where it will lead, but we aren't finding that out. At the end of the program, the money will be passed out and it will be over; there is nothing to carry on the benefits (if there are any) into the future."*

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*Above comments recorded at School Board Meeting, October 12, 1971, Oakland.

Dr. Foster answered these criticisms with a rather lengthy statement of support for the project. We have included parts of that statement for it reflects the general philosophy of the Oakland administration:

> "One of the hallmarks of this administration is that we will not participate in any project unless it is congruent with our basic objectives. The resource department was established for the very reason that we don't want 50 to 100 people coming in to run experiments on the children.
>
> "Now, this particular project is congruent with what we want to do. We have to test out new ways of getting to children; and the concern for undue pressure on them may not be valid. Maybe we need to put more pressure on them to apply themselves and take an interest in their classes. We have our psychological limits; we have our physiological limits. The physiological limits are as when a horse is worked too hard and drops dead. No human being that I know has ever used his physiological limit. I think we, you and I, need to raise our "good enough" limit in everything we do. If we put it another way, when we use the word pressure, we can say that what we are trying to do is stimulate the children to use more of their capacity; and they won't do it unless they are stimulated. It may take incentives to teachers. Teachers working harder to raise the standards is a good way to get the children to perform. I taught for a number of years and I'm not as concerned as some people are about children being such tender little creatures who don't have resilience. I think we need to teach affirmatively, and I wish more teachers would.
>
> "Another thing we need to be concerned with is teacher expectations. If the teachers demand better performance because of rewards, the students will perform better. Where teachers have had greater expectations, the children without one exception have improved. How the teacher viewed the child had significant impact on what the child learned.
>
> "Another objection is paying teachers bonuses to do what their salary pays them for. But, why not? It is hard for that person picking up the skills to be a teacher, why not pay him to stick around and give him a little sunshine?
>
> "If you deal with only the child, and I have had enough experience to know this, you will not solve the problem. By involving the parent in the education of the child, showing them how to help, in most cases it is different. They want to help their children, but don't know how. This added stimulus for them might make the difference. They might say, 'alright, how do I do it? I want to help him read.' These are some things which middle class people have been doing naturally -- sitting down and telling stories, discussing school, helping kids to read by reading with them or to them. Many parents don't know what to do and maybe this incentive will motivate them to find out.

"If we try to put constraints on this type of experiment to make it like every other experiment, then we will get the same results we have gotten from other experiments and they haven't been good. But, we don't know, and if we try to get the end from the beginning, we won't learn anything. I am sure from all I know about learning that we are not going to dunce children by insisting that they produce. I wish we would do more of it. I wish I could build a system where every child is expected to work to capacity!

"On the other question of cost effectiveness, I agree with you that we are going to have to get results and that we must test out the cost effectiveness of everything we do. The government is pouring a lot of money into education and it may be that from this very experiment we will find we have been wrong in the way we approach projects. $4.4 million is a lot of money, and this will show us a new way to put it to more effective use.

"There are so many implications, it almost boggles the mind to think about them -- that communities could get together and offer incentives for the schools -- the kinds of incentives that make sense to the citizens. But, we won't know unless we dare to enter some of these experiments and see what is really going on . I am convinced that this is something Oakland should be bold enough to try. We are going to monitor it, watch it, and see how it works. We may be on the verge of something very significant, and unless we come out with the results of it and show the administration the things that are useful, we won't have gained anything.

"So what I am saying is that I appreciate all the concerns expressed -- they are well taken concerns with the learning process -- but I am sure, the more I know about education and the more I see the system failing thousands of children, that we won't know how to reach them unless we try something different! It may seem outlandish paying parents to do what they should be doing -- teaching their children! $100 per parent to do what they should anyway is very controversial; but it might take that kind of expenditure to create a motivation for them! And, if it does, then we have to recognize that as a fact and begin to find other ways of offering incentives.

"The whole thing we are trying to do is transform potential intelligence into useful intelligence. We know these kids can perform, we know that! We know that everyone in this room is not performing at his maximum level, but we are performing hard enough to be successful. If you are performing on a marginal level, or a little below, however, you won't make it! I want to take the potential intelligence that every one of those kids at Longfellow and Santa Fe has and make it operational. I think this project will give us some clues. It has been indicated that it could fall flat on its face, but if it does then we will have learned that this is not the way and we won't spin our wheels with it again. We will try something else! But for now, we should try it and find out, for I think it has a tremendous potential!" *

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* Recorded at School Board Meeting, Oakland, October 12, 1971.

Dr. Foster, as indicated in his speech to the school board, perceives that this kind of program, if successful, could provide a model for each community to offer incentives to their schools to meet individual community needs. The emphasis on community involvement in school decisions is quite important to the Master Plan for education in Oakland. Ironically, this emphasis created some problems with the community's acceptance of the project. Due to the specific design of the project, we were unable to solicit the support of the community prior to selection of the school sites. The selection decision was made by the U.S.O.E. Project Officer on the basis of data supplied by the Oakland Unified School District. This "neglect" was noted at the meetings with parents and teachers at both the control and experimental schools.

Questions asked at the PTA meeting at Santa Fe on October 20, 1971, were indicative of these concerns. Some of these questions were: "Were the parents consulted about the program?" "Is it true that Longfellow knew about the program before school started?" "Why did Washington Elementary School get out of the Project?" Interestingly enough, most of these questions were asked by teachers. These same questions were asked by the same teacher during the faculty meeting of October 7. This would suggest that the questions were asked again for the benefit of the parents with the hope of stimulating some parent activity. With the exception of not being consulted prior to the selection of Santa Fe, the parents there generally were receptive to the idea. As a matter of fact, some parents challenged the teachers on their reluctance to experiment and be monitored. A comment by one teacher saying the $2500 grant was "peanuts" was met by a chorus of parents who proclaimed that it was certainly better than nothing.

The meeting at Longfellow School drew approximately 50 parents. The questions asked are very indicative of the general receptivity of the community to this kind of

project. Some of the questions were as follows:

> "What about the children who are slow learners and not so able to succeed, will this program cause them undue frustrations?"
>
> "Will the program be based on the whole class or on individuals? Will the teachers tend to pay more attention to certain individual students?"
>
> "Do the children have to know about the incentives being paid?"
>
> "Can the parents decide how they will work with their children, or are there certain guidelines they will have to work within?"
>
> "Why are only math and reading involved?"
>
> "If this experiment is successful, will bonuses be paid by the Office of Education in the future? Or will the program just end, whether it is successful or not?"
>
> "Why has the decision to use Longfellow as an experimental school made without the permission or consultation with parents involved?"
>
> "Why has it taken so long for such a program to come?"

The strongest objections to the program were that the parents were not consulted about their children being used for an experiment and, secondly, that it if was successful, it might not be continued in years to come.

It was difficult at that early stage to assess the impact of the project on the teachers. As one might have expected, some accepted it, others were ambivalent, still others resented it. There was only one teacher at Longfellow, however, who refused to be involved. She would not talk to our monitor or cooperate in any way. Another teacher wrote a letter to the Board of Education protesting the project and Longfellow's part in it.

One incident which reflected the early impact of the project is worth noting. Longfellow School did not have a school nurse, much to the concern of the school principal, faculty, and parents. At one faculty meeting, it was suggested that pressure be put on

the central office to facilitate the appointment of a nurse for the school since it was going to be in the "eye of the public." Shortly after that a nurse was assigned to the school though only on a part time basis.

As the year progressed, the Oakland site continued to generate a great deal of concern and pressure from outside groups. A number of local radio and television programs carried the announcement of the Incentives Project, generally with some editorial comment. Comments ranged from a television talk show to a letter to an editor from a state senator.

Internal opposition continued to come from a small group of teachers at Longfellow School. At one point, two teachers took their classes for a walk rather than meet an appointment with PLANAR's field representative. As a result of that incident, the principal threatened to transfer one of the teachers. The condition became more aggravated when the teacher met with AFT representatives to complain about the project. Our monitor reported that, "PTA meetings held during the early part of the school year continued to reflect the basic opposition to the project; that is, the neglect to notify the community prior to selecting both Santa Fe and Longfellow Schools."

In spite of all that, however, there was some real evidence that some teachers at the experimental site responded to the offer of money incentives. A preliminary glance at the cost analysis data indicates that some teachers had spent up to $500 out of their pocket to purchase materials to help them with the children. The Project Director reported that he overheard a conversation between a parent and a teacher in which the parent said that she wanted to be a $100 parent and wanted the teacher to be a $1200 teacher. There also had been some talk in the faculty lounge about how the money would be spent.

Our monitor further reported, "There seems to be more competition mounting among the teachers now and a greater interest in the Project although some of it is negative." In

a separate report, the monitor recorded that parents of one child said that the teacher sends homework and notes for them to sign in order to verify that the child has brought his work home. They felt there was a lot of competition going on among the teachers at Longfellow also. The monitor further reported that two teachers were overheard arguing over whether students should be taken out of class for traffic duty or not. One teacher felt that the kids needed the time for reading, while the other felt they should also learn other things that would give them a sense of responsibility.

At this point, it is worth noting the different styles of building principals and their possible impact on the project. The principal at Santa Fe (control) school runs a very organized operation. As a matter of fact, the major conflict developing in the control school was over the scheduling of MAC's monitor and TAC's monitors. Prior to the Christmas Vacation, both MAC and TAC were prohibited from entering the school by the principal who felt that disruptions at this time, just prior to Christmas were not necessary. He is reported to be "firm, but fair" in the area of discipline and does not "beat around the bush" but comes right out and makes his decisions quite clear. As a result of this, his rapport with the faculty is quite good and they appreciate his supportive actions.

The principal in the experimental school, however, has a different relationship with his faculty. He feels that the teachers are putting more pressure on him this year by asking for many new supplies which are not available. He also informed our monitor that if he spent time on all the things the teachers requested, he would not have time to be principal and attend to the administrative matters which he feels are of real concern to the school. Our monitor further reported, "He mentioned that things are going along with pressure mounting among reading and math classes."

On February 8, 1972, the ETS Project Director presented to the Oakland experimental

faculty a revised formula and contract. Although some resistance was anticipated, the full level of hostility certainly was not. The chief concern of the faculty seemed to be expressed by one member who is not part of the project. He felt that since he was not in the program, he could ask the question about the relationship between the project and the evaluation of teaching ability by the Oakland School Board. This is interesting in itself for it suggests that the faculty felt threatened by our ETS representative and were suspicious of his motives. Even though the faculty was assured that none of ETS' reports would be seen by the Oakland administration, they simply would not believe it and verbally criticized the project, attacking once again the testing procedures and monitoring intensity. Our feeling is that much of the verbal abuse is basically a release for many of the frustrations that are felt by the faculty because of the general school situation at Longfellow.

Although a great deal of opposition was noted at this meeting, there were absolutely no comments about the change in the payment formula. Although all the teachers eventually signed their contracts, some did so with a great deal of reluctance as the following comments indicate.

> "Since I am involved in this distasteful program entirely against my will, I feel that it is immaterial whether I sign this agreement or not. What choice have I had?"
>
> "I do not agree with this agreement."
>
> "I don't want to sign this as it should have been in our hands at the beginning of the school year. It is invalid. signed (under protest)."
>
> "I will sign the agreement stating that I am participating in the project. However, my BGI's must be revised because they were computed on false information since my class is made up of third graders plus 8 first graders, and this was not taken into account. Mr. Briggs is looking into this and I would like two separate BGI's for the two different levels."

The reaction of the parents to the contracts is most interesting. A PTA meeting was held on March 21, 1972, where an announcement was made by its president for all parents to return their Incentive Project agreements as soon as possible whether signed or not. The following night, the Master Plan Citizens' Committee for Longfellow School met and our monitor recorded the following comments:

> "I resent the project being rammed down my throat. If they wanted to know how this thing will work, they would have asked us first. They think that black people are so apathetic that we don't care if our children learn in school or not. Well, that's a bunch of crap. They say they come into the homes to find out what we are doing with our kids; they are really coming in to see what our homes are like."
>
> "If they really wanted to help the children do better, they would do something different with the schools. Giving us money isn't going to change anything."

In response to these comments, one teacher stated, "I have written letters to the Office of Education in Washington, to my congressman, and the Board of Education because I strongly object to this Project." Whereupon a parent replied, "If you spent as much time trying to get rid of incompetent teachers as you have objecting to the project, you might have been helpful."

Another parent made the comment that, "Instead of talking about what kids are not doing, we should talk about teachers who don't know how to teach black kids. Teachers need special training to know how to work with them. The problem with Longfellow is that you don't have a strong administrator -- this is another handicap."

In addition to the above meetings, two other incidents occurred during the month of March which are worth noting. Westinghouse Broadcasting sent a team to Oakland to interview teachers, parents, principals, and administrators about the Incentives Project. This intense observation -- cameras, etc., -- contributed to the constant pressure the teachers were beginning to feel by the MAC and TAC observations. Some black teachers

were upset that Westinghouse was filming a white teacher's room. They felt that since Longfellow is a black school, a black teacher should be filmed. This does represent the growing friction in the school. There was even some talk of teachers threatening to go "downtown" to straighten out some of the problems of Longfellow.

Dr. Foster, the Superintendent, was interviewed for the same television special. In response to the question, "What do you think the Incentives Project will do?" and "Do you think it is another educational trick?", Dr. Foster replied,

> "I really have no high expectations for results from the Incentives Project. I suspect it will show something about extrinsic motivations and whether or not they will help. I really don't know what the results will be, but it could even be that the control school will do better because of the competition that has been created by this program. It will be interesting to discover if Incentives will make a difference, but frankly, I don't think the difference will be made by extrinsic motivations to teachers and parents."

A few parents were also interviewed for the program. One of them was asked, "Do you think that incentives have made any parents work more with their children than they did before? Has it made you work with your children more?" The parent responded,

> "I think that each parent should have to look at it in his own way, but I feel that the offer of money should make no difference to a parent as to whether or not they urge their children to do well in school. I don't know any parents who didn't help their children before and who do now because of the money. One of my children had a reading problem and had to have special attention, but I have always tried to help my kids study. On the other hand, the money could help buy some of the things kids need for school."

By April, most of the teachers at both the experimental and control schools had met with parents. Our monitor reports suggest that the control school parents have met more frequenlty with the teachers than the experimental school parents. At any rate, the children are very much aware of the project and our monitor, on April 12, reported the following:

> "Children's attitudes toward teachers at both schools seem to be good. Some students are now conscious of their parents getting on them to do well in school. Many

> of them have asked me if I am the man who will make it possible for them to get a prize if they do well. On some occasions when I walk into a classroom, the children whisper to one another that I was at their home to ask their parents about their school work."

Our monitor further reported that parents from both schools are aware of what is going on especially in the control school. "There are parent teacher conferences which are well attended by parents. They are concerned about their children ... Most parents think that if the program is going to benefit the children or increase their skills, then they are for it."

As the year progressed and the program moved into the months of April and May, a number of activities were noted by our monitor.

1. A tutoring program was being carried on at Longfellow by a group of high school students on a one to one basis with Longfellow students. The tutors were assigned to a teacher and spent 30 to 35 minutes per class period with the children. Our monitor reports that,

> "It is felt that these tutors are working out well and the teachers are glad to have their help. The children get more of the individual attention they need. At Santa Fe, although they do not have tutors, they have parent volunteers for the children who need more help. One teacher, particularly at at Santa Fe, is making use of peer tutoring by using a 6th grade class to help with the younger students. The younger ones like having the older children help them and seem to be comprehending the material fairly well."

2. There appears to be an increased use throughout the year of small group work with an attempt to individualize materials for the children. The monitor reports stated,

> February 11, Control School: "A first grade teacher used a method which combined board work and seat work with the class divided into groups. The children were solving equations and were working with work sheets they had made themselves."
>
> February 26, Control School: "She was working with a small group while others were writing and using their workbooks. The first group was reading and practicing homonyms. The second group was practicing syllabication and homonyms."

March 4, Control School: "He was using the board and charts and was involved in a question and answer interaction with one group. While he worked with them, the other group was writing an assignment."

March 11, Experimental School: "The teacher worked with a small group for a time, trying to individualize materials for them. There was a group working without her doing silent reading."

March 11, Experimental School: "She asked questions of the whole class, and for a short time, worked with a small group. The students read aloud and answered questions about the readings. While working with a few students individually, she praised them for their work and conduct."

In light of the activity observed by our monitor, one would assume that the teachers, both in the control and experimental schools, would begin to be more supportive of the project. This, however, is not the case, and during the latter months of the project, we still were picking up derogatory comments about the project from both groups of teachers. For example, one teacher did not like the idea of incentives for teachers or parents because she felt it would create an undue sense of competitiveness among teachers and also could see some parents putting undue pressure on their children. Another teacher expressed that she saw the program as beneficial to the control school because the money would be used to buy needed supplies and materials. A third teacher stated, "the program has not influenced my performance in the classroom one way or another." A fourth felt it was "a waste of time and taxpayers' money and a good example of why there should be no government intervention in education." Another felt that the project was not feasible for teachers or parents. She thinks the idea of paying a teacher to perform better stems from the country's feelings now and she is insulted by the idea of getting extra money for being a teacher, and feels especially bad for the children who must live with it at home as well as at school.

Tentative Conclusions

At this juncture, prior to the post-test results, it is difficult to make any kind of definitive conclusions. Further more, Part IV of this preliminary evaluation report will deal specifically with the hypotheses and provide a more complete analysis. However, the following kinds of general conclusions regarding the change process can be made at this point.

1. The Project has had an important impact on the internal operations of the experimental school. As has been reported earlier, conflicts between teachers, and between teachers and principal have developed this year. In part, the incentive variable has been responsible for this activity as evidenced by demands for additional supplies and services. To a greater extent, the conflicts have been stimulated by the constant pressure of teacher evaluation. Questions asked the MAC representatives and statements made to the MAC monitor reinforce this conclusion. It is our contention that the exposure of teachers brought about by the project has brought to the surface some deep rooted problems. In those school systems where the principal is out of tune with the faculty, the problems seem to intensify. Hence the combination of (1) existing problems, (2) administration style, and (3) pressure from constant exposure leads to "explosions."

2. The educational climate in Oakland has been a critical factor in the receptivity to the incentive program. The efforts on the part of the Oakland administration to decentralize the decision making down to the individual schools and communities seem to be in conflict with the decision made initially in this project. Certainly, the above report is filled with comments by both parents and teachers about the lack of opportunity that they, as a community, had to volunteer to be a part of this project. Obviously, in some cases, this

was used as an excuse to cover up for those who opposed experimentation in general and to evaluation of teaching in particular.

3. Although the criticism of the project continued throughout the year, and certainly intensified at the period of contract signing, there is some evidence that additional efforts have been made this year by teachers in both schools. At this particular time, our monitor reports indicate that there is no special activity being carried on in the experimental school that is not being carried out in the control school. Hence, the tentative conclusion would be that both faculties have responded, although late in the year, to the project and the eventual student evaluation.

Section V: San Antonio, Texas

The San Antonio Independent School District serves a total population of 73,215 children. Of that total, 62.3% are Spanish American, 15.7% are black, and 22% are white. In area #2, where the Incentives Project was being conducted, 37.3% of the students are white, 37.7% are black and 24.6% are Spanish American. A further breakdown shows that at Washington Elementary School (543 students), 95% of the student population is black and 6% Spanish American. At Tynan Elementary School (399 students) 95.5% are black and 4.5% are Spanish American.

Of all the four sites selected for the project, San Antonio has the weakest teachers' organization and the lowest salary scales. The scale ranges from $6,500 for a beginning teacher to a maximum of $10,303. Our cost analysis of the sixth grade at both the experimental and control schools disclosed that the average salary for teachers at Tynan (control) is $6,958, and at Washington (experimental) it is $8,268.

* * * *

Throughout the entire project, the atmosphere at San Antonio has been receptive to the project. A cooperative environment has existed between the school district, the individual schools, the teachers and the MAC. The initial meeting in August, 1971, was an indication of this condition for the selection team (MAC, TAC, and USOE Project Officer) met with no opposition from any of the representative teachers and administrators. At the initial visit, the superintendent indicated his desire for the San Antonio Independent School District to be selected as a site for the parent/teacher model. Fortunately for San Antonio, Cincinnati chose not to take the parent/teacher model. San Antonio was

subsequently given the opportunity to work with their first choice. The wishes of the superintendent were reinforced when the Board voted unanimously for the parent/teacher model on October 14, 1971. Considering the opposition in Cincinnati and Oakland, this can be viewed either as an indication of the Board's support for the superintendent or a general receptivity to the notion of experimentation with incentives programs of this sort.

When the project was presented to the teachers at Washington Elementary School by MAC, no opposition was expressed. Instead, there was every evidence that teachers other than the math and reading teachers wanted to help even though they would not receive any direct financial rewards. Comments about the "insulting" aspects of paying teachers, which were expressed by some teachers later on, were not stated at this point. There are a number of reasons for this: First of all, the Director of Special Programs for the district gave the teachers a "sales pitch" before the project was explained. Secondly, the teachers in that section of the country have not developed a strong organization, hence tend to accept whatever the central administration proposes for them. Thirdly, the principal's enthusiasm for the project was transmitted to her staff. She closed the meeting by telling the teachers that everyone was going to receive the maximum and they would all then take a trip to Europe.

At a subsequent meeting three weeks later, more questions were asked about the project, but even then, the comments and questions related to "why were Tynan and Washington chosen?" and "why don't all teachers get the same incentive?" "Can the art and music teachers participate in the project?" and "what about the teachers who teach in departmentalized classrooms?" The major point of the concern during the early months of the project dealt with the testing procedures and tests used. Since the "judgment"

of the teachers is so closely connected to the testing procedure, the comments were understandable. The usual comment about the "appropriateness" of standardized tests for these children was expressed.

The parents, on the other hand, were not concerned with the testing procedure, but rather expressed concerns about the parents who were not at the PTA meeting. One comment made at the October 26, 1971 meeting, with parents at Washington (experimental) was indicative of this. According to our monitor reports, the parent asked, "What can we do, other than be concerned?" This initiated a dialogue about rewarding children in the home for work done. One parent stated that, "she had been provided with incentives by her parents and that this was effective with her, so she uses it with her children, individualizing the nature of the incentive for the particular child." Another commented that if she paid her child money this year, then she might have to do it next year, when she wouldn't have any money coming into her.

Another typical comment reported to us was from a grandmother who attended the meeting, and stated, "she spent time at home with her kids and granddhildren giving them various kinds of incentives to motivate them to do well." She felt that this was a good program and was "glad to see the government trying to do something to help," and that it was "parents' and teachers' responsibilities to go along with this project."

The interesting aspect of this early reaction from the parents was that a dialogue was initiated about the use of incentives for students as motivators. No comments were made about the incentives as a motivator for parents.

A great deal of community interest was generated in San Antonio during the early months of the project. A report from the Project Director, Mr. Sylvester Green, stated, "for the past three weeks (October 1 - 22, 1971), I have appeared weekly on the three

local television stations explaining the Incentives Project to the general public and arranged for the televising of unrehearsed classroom action scenes at Washington and Tynan schools. At this time (October 22, 1971), I am waiting for the appearance of a news reporter, and a representative of American Broadcasting Company." On Sunday, October 24, 1971, the general manager of WAOI-TV, the largest TV and news broadcasting system in the San Antonio area, spent three minutes in a moral diatribe over the project.

Throughout the entire project, our monitor reports indicated that there was little opposition. This was substantiated by interviews with San Antonio administrators and first hand observations by ETS, Inc. personnel. Yet comments in the press indicate to the contrary. In an interview with the president of the San Antonio Teachers' Council over a local TV news show, the statement was made that,

> "Many of the teachers objected to the program because they felt insulted by it. They don't like the idea of a carrot dangling in front of their faces in order to make them do their best. Furthermore, many of the parents are also insulted by the idea of being paid to be better parents.... The only reason the board passed the program was that many of them knew nothing about it, since that particular meeting was quite long, and the members had much material to read in order to prepare for the meeting."

An article in the National Observer reported that the superintendent said, "We felt obligated to co-operate because the government has helped us in so many ways before.... That doesn't mean we're in love with the program. We're just making our facilities available." The same article reported two different comments from teachers at Washington Elementary (experimental) that are worth noting. "Doctors don't get paid more to dispense medicine in ghettoes... we consider ourselves in the same category of professionalism, and we shouldn't have to be paid extra to do our job." That statement was balanced with the following, "I keep asking myself, what more can I do? Because

I really want to do a good job, and possibly because I'd like the money too. Probably I'd go the extra step anyway, but maybe the money is reminding me there is an extra step to be taken."

Halfway through the year, our monitor reports indicated that there was no specific response to the pre-tests and that the activity at the control school was very similar to the experimental school. The teacher activity profile and student activity profile charts were remarkably similar. The only areas of difference noted were that the experimental school principal reported an increase in parent contacts with teachers over last year, and that more teachers (57%) in the experimental school had attempted to get additional materials for their classes than their counter parts in the control school (8%).

The teachers were presented with the "new" formula and contracts on February 10, 1972. The reaction was interesting in that there were no comments about the change in formula. As was reported in the March Report, the teachers expressed concern about the general poor performance of the students as they progressed from one grade level to the next. As a matter of fact, at least two teachers at Washington wanted to make sure that the administration knew of the dismal showing in the pre-test, with the hope that "something could be done." Only one teacher made threatening sounds about not signing the contract. She, in fact, did sign two weeks later.

As of April, our monitor reports would indicate that there is no evidence of any significant different activities between the experimental school and the control school. Any "unusual" activity is much more a function of the teachers than of the condition of possible financial reward. Teachers in both schools were designing word and math games for their students, purchasing additional educational aids, and trying to individualize instruction.

As with the other sites, the administrative style has a great impact on the mood of the faculty and general atmosphere of the school. The principal of Washington Elementary School (experimental), is a dedicated, concerned administrator who seems to have a great deal of rapport with her teachers and parents. Throughout the entire project, she has been an important force in attempting to use the project to stimulate her teachers. She, personally, has made several attempts to get additional money from the district superintendent, without too much success. She told us that she has been "receiving cooperation from other schools within the area that have allowed her to share materials for her teachers." She has even applied pressure on the Project Director to give her some money to sponsor a trip for all children (and their parents and teachers) who achieved above a .2 grade level gain or greater than the expected gains.

When asked about her comments regarding the project, she stated that teachers were definitely planning more than they did last year, requesting more materials and apparently devoting greater time and effort towards some of the higher achieving students who, heretofore, were rather neglected. She felt very strongly that the parent involvement component will constitute a significant variable in the results to be achieved. Certainly if the project shows success in San Antonio, a great deal of the credit must be given to the efforts of this principal.

Perhaps due to the fact that the control school teachers will <u>not</u> be paid on an individual basis, the principal of Tynan Elementary School has not been as actively supportive of the program. She did not seem to have the same amount of rapport with her teachers as the experimental school principal did, as indicated by a number of incidents of conflict which were reported during the year.

Tentative Conclusions

The general environment of the San Antonio District is an important factor in determining the receptivity to the Incentives Project. Both parents and teachers seemed to be less "insulted" by the bonus concept than at some of the other sites. Teachers in the San Antonio Independent School District are still used to generally accepting the wishes of the administration. Even so, there is little evidence that anything has changed as a result. Unlike some other districts, the schools being examined have not responded to the pressure of constant observation. This is attributable to the kinds of administration procedures that we have shown. This is particularly true in the experimental school, Washington.

PART IV: ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES

Section I: Cincinnati, Ohio

1. Parents of children in the experimental schools will be more aware of the child's progress in reading than control school parents will be.

Results: Parental awareness of progress in reading seems to extend to the grades their children bring home. They are not familiar with teachers' methods or with the actual activities their children are doing in class. There is no significant difference between the experimental and control schools, although fewer experimental parents (i.e., 11 out of 26, or 42%) felt their children were doing better in reading than last year. Of the control parents, 25 out of 40 (or 62%) felt their children were making more progress. Although this is the parents' opinion of the child's progress, it reflects how aware they are of what is going on and there seems to be no difference in the awareness of parents.

2. Parents of children in the experimental school will be more aware of the child's progress in arithmetic than parents of children in the control school.

Results: Parental awareness of children's progress in arithmetic is comparable to their awareness of reading progress. They know, in most cases, what grades the children bring home, but are not familiar with specific programs or teaching methods. They are not aware of the child's day to day progress in arithmetic This is the case in both the experimental and control schools; there is no difference noted.

3. There will be more parent - teacher contact in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: There is more effort on the part of parents to contact teachers in the control school than in the experimental school. Of the control parents interviewed (total = 40), 80% of them had contacted teachers or visited them. In the experimental school, of the 26 parents interviewed, 46% had contacted teachers. The control school has parent organizations in the form of Mothers Clubs, but the experimental school has none. Therefore, the amount of parental involvement with teachers in the experimental school may be a reflection of the lack of parent organizations rather than a result of the Incentives Project or a reflection of its precepts. The general indication with regard to teachers is that in neither the experimental nor the control school do they go out of their way to contact parents. There are two teachers in the experimental school who are an exception, but the general trend is not to be in contact with parents.

4. Experimental school parents will do more school related work with other parents than control parents will.

Results: Parents from neither the experimental school nor the control school work with or discuss school with other parents. One out of 26 experimental parents said she discussed school with another parent, and again, only one out of the 40 control parents answered the question positively.

5. Parents of experimental school children will attend more PTA meetings and/or school functions that control parents will.

Results: Control school parents attend more meetings and school functions than experimental parents do because the control school had more meetings. Neither school has a PTA, but the control school has Mothers Clubs which meet at irregular intervals. As the experimental school, parents have attended open house functions well, as is indicated by 53% of the parents interviewed who said they had attended school functions. Of the control parents interviewed, 62% had attended school functions. Though 9% more control parents have attended school functions, this does not seem significant in light of the fewer numbers of meetings which experimental parents might have attended.

6. There will be more written comments between school and home in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Although there is more parent - teacher contact in the control school than in the experimental school (Reference Hypothesis #3), there is very little written communication between school and home in either school, and there has been no difference witnessed in the intensity of this written communication.

7. Experimental school parents will spend more time helping their children with school related work than control school parents will.

Results: Control school parents help their children somewhat more than experimental school parents do, as indicated in the results of the monitor's interviews. 68% of the control parents indicate helping the children with school work while 42% of the experimental parents do. However, neither group of parents seems to be overly concerned about helping the children study as evidenced by their general comments.

8. Experimental school parents will spend more money buying academic materials to assist their children's progress than control school parents will.

Results: A number of parents in both schools buy small items such as flash cards, educational games, books, etc., to increase their child's skill levels. Few, however, have made major purchases like encyclopedias or that kind of educational aid. A number of mothers have joined local libraries and do take their children there. It is accurate to say, however, that there is no significant difference between the experimental and control parents in the amount of money they spend or in the things they buy as educational aids.

9. Experimental school parents will have higher aspirations for their children than will control school parents.

Results: There is no difference in the aspirations of parents for their children between the experimental and control schools. Parents may have high hopes or low hopes for their children, but their attitudes have not been affected by the knowledge that teachers have been offered incentives.

10. Experimental school parents will encourage their children to help each other with school work more than control school parents will.

Results: Although neither group of parents encourages children to work with children from other families, they do have older children help the younger ones within the family. In fact, quite often the children help each other while parents don't help at all. There is, however, no difference between experimental and control families in the amount of help given to children or in who gives it. In 45% of the control homes, older children helped younger ones, while the figure was 50% in experimental homes--only slightly higher.

11. In the experimental school families there will be more parental pressure on children to succeed than there will be in the control school families.

Results: There is more parental pressure on control children to succeed than on the experimental school children which is probably a reflection of the higher economic condition of the control school families. The economic status seems to have been a stronger positive influence for parents to help their children than the offer of incentives to the experimental school teachers. There are approximately 19% more welfare families in the experimental school area and, according to our parent interview guides, experimental parents help their children with school work 26% less than do control school parents.

12. Experimental school parents will have a better attitude toward teachers than will control school parents.

Results: Parents in both schools have very similar attitudes toward the teachers. Their opinions are either that the teacher is very good or that he is "O.K.;" in no case has a parent expressed dislike or disapproval of a teacher. When comparing percentages of positive opinions between experimental and control parents, the amounts differ by 12%, with control parents, again, having somewhat more favorable attitudes.

13. Experimental school parents will have a more positive attitude toward the project than control school parents will.

Results: Parental attitudes to the project are most accurately described as neutral. For the most part, they are unaware. There are slightly more favorable opinions from experimental parents (65% approve) than from control parents (57% approve), but there were no negative reactions from any parents recorded in these interviews. Thus, they either don't know about the project, or they don't really care, or both.

14. Experimental school parents will have a more favorable attitude to their child's educational program than control school parents will.

Results: It is not evident that there are more favorable attitudes toward teachers coming from experimental parents than from control parents. In fact, both groups of parents generally express similarly favorable opinions. These parents simply are not critical of teachers or their methods.

15. Experimental school parents will have more favorable attitudes toward the school in general than control school parents will.

Results: Parents are generally interested in the schools, but this interest is more evident in the control school because there is more effort on the part of that school to involve the parents. Many experimental parents, however, have expressed the feeling of wanting that school to have more meetings so they can be more involved. Both groups of parents, however, feel positive about the role of the schools in their communities; neither group is very critical.

16. Experimental school teachers will spend more time teaching reading than control school teachers will.

Results: Reading has been emphasized heavily in both schools, but more so in the control school because of the ESEA Special Reading Program there. This program is for the first three grades and supplies them with an extra reading teacher. The children have reading instruction both in their regular classes and with the ESEA

teacher. Statistics gathered from teacher interviews indicate that experimental teachers, on average, spend 5.5 hours per week teaching reading while the control teachers average 8.5 hours per week teaching reading--a full 3 hours per week more which should show up significant results in the children's progress.

17. There will be more references to reading skills observed in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: The skill of reading is heavily emphasized in both schools especially in comparison to other subjects, but there is no discernible difference between the experimental and control schools in the degree to which reading is stressed. Many teachers offer such rewards as recognition on bulletin boards and prizes for good achievement in reading, but, again, a cross school comparison shows little difference in degree of these reminders and encouragements for reading.

18. Experimental school teachers will spend more time teaching arithmetic than control school teachers will.

Results: Monitor reports indicate that some experimental teachers who teach both science and arithmetic tended to spend heavier portions of their time on arithmetic instruction at the expense of science. This tendency seems to show in a comparison of the average hours per week spent on math between the experimental arithmetic teachers (4-1/2 hours per week), and the control arithmetic teachers (3.6 hours per week). This data is not conclusive, however, since only three arithmetic/science teachers were interviewed in the experimental school, but observations of their classes did show that they tended to emphasize arithmetic more than science.

19. There will be more references to arithmetic skills in the experimental school than there will be in the control school.

Results: Generally speaking, reference to arithmetic skills is not a strong tendency in either school. Although both groups of teachers, experimental and control, use extra instructional aids (some of which they make themselves) and decorate their rooms with arithmetic related information, they also do these things for science, social studies, etc. to a large extent. The emphasis on arithmetic may be heavier, but not by very much. In addition, it does not seem that there is a significant difference in this emphasis between the experimental and control schools.

20. Experimental school teachers will exercise greater control and exert more discipline over their classes than control school teachers will.

Results: Especially toward the end of the year, experimental teachers have had to exert more efforts to control their classes than the control teachers. This increase in the need for discipline is most accurately classified as a result of the absence of the principal and the fact that the entire experimental school has been less organized in her absence. Classroom observations show that criticism of children's conduct is nearly twice as intense in the experimental school as in the control school. It would be inaccurate to say, however, that this greater degree of discipline in the experimental school has been a result of the teachers' desire to earn the incentives; they seem to be reacting to the chaotic situation.

21. Experimental school teachers will encourage peer tutoring among students more than control school teachers will.

Results: Although a great deal of class work is done in groups for both reading and arithmetic in both schools, the degree to which the children help each other is minimal. Teachers do not encourage children to work together although one experimental teacher has done so more than any of the others. The children in both schools are urged to do their own work and to avoid consulting each other.

22. Experimental school teachers will use individual instructional materials more than control school teachers will.

Results: Many experimental teachers have used individualized learning aids, especially in reading. These include listening posts and records as well as a method by which the children keep track of their own progress on index cards. The monitor also noted individualized instruction kits for science and arithmetic; one experimental teacher made up individual word games (cigar box games) for the children to use in their extra time. The control school teachers have also used individual instructional aids similar to those used in the experimental school, but their emphasis on individual instruction does not seem to be as heavy as in the experimental school.

23. Experimental school teachers will spend a greater part of their time instructing students individually than control school teachers will.

Results: In both schools, classwork is heavily geared toward small groups. The teachers circulate between them, helping as needed. Very little time is actually spent with the children individually. The size of the groups varies from half of the class to 4 or 5 students. There is no discernible difference between control and experimental teachers in their emphasis on small groups or individual instruction. ..

24. Experimental school teachers will spend more time testing their students than control school teachers will.

Results: Testing has not been heavily emphasized in either school. Most testing in both schools is of the short, drill method. In reading, teachers check over workbooks regularly. Toward the end of the year, however, the monitor reported one teacher using tests similar to the type to be given as post-tests. Data from classroom observations, shows that experimental teachers have tested more intensely than control teachers have, although this may be skewed because of the fewer experimental classes observed.

25. Experimental school teachers will use material rewards for good student behavior or work more than control school teachers will.

Results: There was no difference observed between the experimental and control schools in the amount of praise used by teachers or in rewards given. The data collected from classroom observations also shows no difference. In both schools, teachers used what is probably an average amount of praise and rewards; the use of rewards was rarely heavy in any classroom.

26. Experimental teachers will spend more time preparing lesson plans than control school teachers will.

Results: Teachers in neither school work together helping each other plan lessons, but control school teachers, according to the teacher interviews, spend more time preparing for both reading and arithmetic classes than the experimental teachers do.

27. Experimental school teachers will spend less time in class on clerical/administrative duties than control school teachers will.

Results: Teachers in both schools are not required to do very much in the way of clerical and adminstrative duties. Much of the supervisory tasks are done by ESEA aides or the principals. There has been no noticeable difference between the experimental and control schools in the time spent on clerical/ administrative duties.

28. Experimental school teachers will have more meetings with each other than control school teachers will.

Results: There is no significant difference between experimental and control schools in the amount of time teachers spend in meetings. Both groups spend between 1/2 and 1 hour per week in meetings. They do not work together on class

related activities. Meetings generally are concerned with who will go on field trips, etc. Neither group of teachers spends time after school doing additional things for their classes.

29. Experimental teachers will take a greater part in decision making for the school than control school teachers will.

Results: Both the experimental and control school principals have said that teachers have a large part in the decision making process in the schools, however, it is probably more accurate to say that both principals consult only a few particular teachers. With the long absence of the experimental school principal, however, teachers at that school have indeed taken a much greater part in running their school than have the control teachers, but this cannot be called a result encouraged by the Incentives Project. In regard to autonomy in books and curriculum, both the experimental and control teachers seem to have the same degree of influence.

30. Experimental school teachers will request more instructional days while control school teachers will not.

Results: There have been no additional instructional days nor requests for any in either school.

31. Experimental school teachers will request more resources (such as reading specialists, diagnostic testing, psychological counseling, or extra materials) than control school teachers will.

Results: There have been very few requests for additional resources from either group of teachers and not enough to note a difference between experimental and control teachers.

32. Teacher absenteeism will be less in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: There has been no significant difference in the number of days teachers have been absent in either the experimental or control school.

33. Experimental school students will study in groups outside of school more than control school students will.

Results: There are no reported incidents of students studying together outside of school and, in school they are not often encouraged to work together.

34. Experimental school students will study together more in school than control students will.

Results: Children work in groups together in both schools to approximately the same degree. It seems, however, that although they are physically in groups, they do not necessarily help each other with their work. For the most part, they are encouraged to not collaborate. The tendency toward non-collaboration in group situations seems to be the same in both schools.

35. Experimental school students will be assigned more written work than control students will.

Results: Students observed in both the experimental and control schools do a lot of writing, but there is no difference between schools in the amount of writing they do. Data collected from classroom observation guides show merely that 2% more writing was observed in the experimental school.

36. Experimental school children will be more attentive to learning activities than control students will.

Results: Observations indicate that there is not a major difference in the degree to which students are involved in their learning activities between the experimental and control school. Classroom observation data show that control school students are 6% more attentive but this is too slight a difference to be significant.

37. There will be more peer tutoring among experimental school students than control school students.

Results: There is a small degree of peer tutoring in both schools, but not much difference between schools in the amount. Teachers do not encourage students to help each other in either school, consequently students tend to work independently of each other.

38. More classroom control and discipline will be maintained by students among themselves in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: As with peer assistance, peer discipline or control is very minimal in both schools and there is no degree of difference in comparison between the experimental and control schools.

39. Experimental school students will have a more positive attitude toward reading than control school students will.

Results: Students in both schools have good attitudes toward reading. They like using the resources available and also tend to make use of the library in school. However, again, there does not seem to be any difference between experimental and control school in the students' attitudes to reading.

40. Experimental school students will have a better attitude toward arithmetic than control school students will have.

Results: Both groups of students have good attitudes toward math, but there is no discernible difference noted in observations at the schools. Among the parents, however, 38% of the experimental ones feel their children are doing better in math while 22% of the control parents say this.

41. Experimental school students will be more concerned for the success of their peers than control school students will.

Results: The experimental school students show a normal amount of concern for the success of their friends, but no more than control students show for each other. It seems that, in this regard, students have been very little affected by the Incentives Project.

Section II: Duval County, Florida

1. Parents of children in the experimental schools will be more aware of the child's progress in reading than control school parents will be.

Results: Parents in both the experimental and control schools were more aware of the child's program in reading at the end of the year than at the beginning. Most of the parents relied on report cards to indicate progress. Our monitor reports indicate that there was no significant difference in the level of awareness between the experimental and control school parents. When asked about the child's progress in reading, this year compared to last year, 81% of the experimental parents and 89% of the control parents felt that more reading skills were being learned this year.

2. Parents of children in the experimental school will be more aware of the child's progress in arithmetic than parents of children in the control school.

Results: The parents in both schools were generally not able to distinguish between reading and arithmetic awareness. Monitor reports indicate that there is no significant difference in the awareness levels. When asked about the child's progress in arithmetic this year, compared to last year, the experimental parents responded 79% more progress, 11% same, 7% less and 2% no answer. The control school parents responded to the same question showing that 88% felt more was being learned, 9% same, 2% less and 2% no answer .

3. There will be more parent/teacher contact in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: The monitor reports indicate that there is much more contact between parents and teachers at the experimental school than in the control. Our monitor stated, "There seems to be very little parent/teacher contact at the control school. Most of the teachers will get in contact with parents if there is a specific problem involved with a student. Other than that, there is not much effort to meet parents just to get acquainted." On the other hand, parent/teacher contact at the experimental school has intensified as the year progressed. The report of April 8, 1972 (regarding the experimental school): "Parent contact seems to be good--teachers are seeing parents on one basis or another. Parents are coming out now to talk with the teachers about specific things such as behavior, assignments, etc."

The results of parent interviews, however, indicate that there is little difference between the experimental and control school parents/teacher contacts. This is probably due to the tendency for the interviewee to respond in a manner which she (he) believes will please the interviewer.

4. Experimental school parents will do more school related work with other parents than control parents will.

Results: There have not been any reported accounts of parents working with other parents outside of school. The experimental school had more special programs for the parents, however, including a Paretn Day when parents took over the classes. Because of the nature of the surrounding environments, i.e., higher SES at the control school, the parents interviews results showed that 12.5% of control school parents discussed school with other parents, whereas 8.5% of the experimental school parents claimed to have had such discussions.

5. Parents of experimental school children will attend more PTA meetings and/or school functions than control parents will.

Results: There is a substantial difference between the experimental school and control school in this category. For example, at the first PTA meeting at the control school, only 10 parents showed up. Our monitor reported that a similar meeting at the experimental school was "very well attended by parents." The chief reason for this is probably due to the effort of the experimental school principal. Special programs are presented by children as part of the PTA meetings and hence draw more parents. The parent interviews results substantiate this: 37.5% of the control school parents interviewed claimed to have attended school functions; 52% of the experimental school parents interviewed stated that they had attended school functions.

6. There will be more written comments between school and home in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: There is no substantial difference in the degree of written comments between school and home reported at the experimental and control schools. Most written communications are in the form of report cards, which are standard for both schools. The parent interview guides indicated that there is no substantial difference in individual teacher/parent contacts: 63% of parents have contacted teachers in the experimental and 69% in the control school. 23% of the parents interviewed were contacted by teachers from the experimental school and 29% of parents interviewed were contacted by teachers from the control school.

7. Experimental school parents will spend more time helping their children with school related work than control school parents will.

Results: Generally, the monitor reports indicate that "parents don't have much time to spend with their children so that on average, the students don't get much help from parents. A recent report, however, noted that parents seem to spend a small amount of time with their children, but more than before observed.

The parent interview guides reported the following information regarding whether or not parents help their children with homework assignments:

	YES	NO	NO ANSWER
Experimental	66%	16%	18%
Control	86%	3%	11%

The reported trend reflects the general environmental condition surrounding both schools, with the level of welfare higher at the experimental school than at the control school.

8. Experimental school parents will spend more money buying academic materials to assist their children's progress than control school parents will.

Results: The parent interview guides results indicate that there is no significant difference between the experimental and control school parents in this category. Both sets of parents claim to purchase books, but this has not been substantiated by any hard evidence.

9. Experimental school parents will have higher aspirations for their children than will control school parents.

Results: There was very little reported on this hypothesis. Certainly, no differences were noted by the monitor between the control and experimental school parents.

10. Experimental school parents will encourage their children to help each other with school work more than control school parents will.

Results: Parents in both experimental and control school homes encourage older children to help younger ones. In many homes visited, parents leave the entire responsibility of assisting younger children to their older siblings. There is little difference in the degree to which this is done between control and experimental families; it is widespread in both.

11. In the experimental school families there will be more parental pressure on children to succeed than there will be in the control school families.

Results: Parents, as a general rule in both schools, don't put much pressure on the children to study or to do well in school. Many who do spend time with their children can't afford to give very much time. Data shows that more control parents (86%) help their children than experimental parents (66%).

12. Experimental school parents will have a better attitude toward teachers than will control school parents.

Results: Parents feel that the teachers are doing a good job and like them even though some parents have never met any of the teachers. This attitude is remarkably similar among control and experimental parents; 62% of the experimental parents interviewed expressed positive feelings about teachers, while 68% of the control parents did.

13. Experimental school parents will have a more positive attitude toward the project than control school parents will.

Results: The most characteristic feeling among both groups of parents with regard to the project is that they are unaware of it. Of the experimental parents interviewed, 39% favored it, none were opposed, and the rest were unaware or simply had no opinion of it. The control parents were divided similarly with 32% in favor, none opposed, and the rest either unaware or undecided. Of those who favored the project, quite often it was merely because of the extra attention the schools got, not because they agreed with the philosophical aspects of it.

14. Experimental parents will have a more favorable attitude to their chi ld's program than control parents will.

Results: Parents feelings about the children's programs among both experimental and control groups, are very similar in that they do not oppose any of the schools' programs. Their attitude is quite often one of "blissful ignorance;" parents seem to feel that whatever the school or teachers do is alright.

15. Experimental school parents will have more favorable attitudes toward the school in general than control school parents will.

Results: There have been few negative remarks from either group of parents regarding the school. Parents are not critical of the school, and if there are negative feelings, they are almost always the result of a disciplinary act on the part of a teacher. The general attitude of experimental and control parents toward the school is one of acceptance.

16. Experimental school teachers will spend more time teaching reading than control school teachers will.

Results: Data from teacher interviews shows that the experimental teachers all year have spent approximately .6 hours/week more on reading instruction than have the control teachers. It is also interesting to note that both groups are spending at least one hour per week more on reading now than they did in the earlier part of the year (Sept - Dec.), which may show a greater feeling of competition toward the end of the project.

17. There will be more references to reading skills observed in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Reference to reading has been especially strong in the experimental school where teachers have made many efforts to give it extra emphasis by such things as games, wall displays, and libraries. This emphasis seems to be stronger in the experimental school where teachers just generally seem to show a greater degree of concern and enthusiasm for reading instruction.

18. Experimental school teachers will spend more time teaching arithmetic than control teachers will.

Results: Teachers in both the experimental and control schools spend approximately the same amount of time on arithmetic instruction: experimental teachers - 4.5 hours per week, control teachers - 4.6 hours per week.

19. There will be more references to arithmetic skills in the experimental school than there will be in the control school.

Results: The references to or degree of emphasis on arithmetic is similar between schools. In both schools, this emphasis is considerably less than that on reading. There are not as many room displays or extra activities for the children in arithmetic, but this low degree of emphasis is found to be to the same degree in both schools.

20. Experimental school teachers will exercise greater control and exert more discipline over their classes than control school teachers will.

Results: Teachers in the experimental school hold themselves more responsible for discipline of students than do control teachers. The control teachers referred more than twice as many students to the principal (i.e., 15:34). In addition, the experimental teachers appointed "building chairmen" among themselves whose duties were to keep order for the separate areas of the school. This emphasis on discipline among those teachers is best seen as partially resulting from the Incentives Project, but mostly as a result of teacher attitudes to the principal, to whom they do not feel comfortable in referring problems.

21. Experimental school teachers will encourage peer tutoring among students more than control school teachers will.

Results: Instruction in both schools is geared to small groups, but peer tutoring seems to be encouraged more in the experimental school. Observations show these students working more together while control observations show more independent

work in the context of small groups. One experimental school teacher was noted to have her better students working on assignments with poorer ones--a method which seemed to increase the learning of both.

22. Experimental school teachers will use individual instructional materials more than control school teachers will.

Results: Teachers in the experimental school do not really have more individual instructional materials, but they seem to spend more time preparing their own resources for individual help than do control teachers. Classroom observations indicate that more experimental classrooms are equipped with reading materials although the difference between experimental and control classrooms is not large in this category.

23. Experimental school teachers will spend a greater part of their time instructing students individually than control school teachers will.

Results: Experimental teachers do seem to spend more time with individual students than control teachers do. A number of experimental teachers use their free period working with problem students. They have also, as a group, requested more assistance in this regard from the reading resource teacher. Generally speaking, experimental teachers seem to show a higher interest in helping each individual student than control teachers do.

24. Experimental school teachers will spend more time testing their students than control school teachers will.

Results: The monitor has reported on a number of occasions that experimental teachers are very concerned about how the children will do on the post-tests. However, the actual amount of time spent testing is significantly greater in the control school. Experimental teachers are reported to be teaching their students how to take tests such as the post-test, but still, the actual amount of time they spend testing is small, according to observations of classes. In reading, experimental teachers say they spend 4.4% of their time testing while control teachers, on average, spend 6% of their time testing.

25. Experimental teachers will use material rewards for good student behavior or work more than control teachers will.

Results: Classroom observation data shows that experimental teachers praise their students and reward them with little prizes to a significantly greater extent than control teachers do.

26. Experimental school teachers will spend more time preparing lesson plans than control school teachers will.

Results: Experimental teachers spend more than twice as much time preparing for class as do control teachers. On average, experimental teachers spend 8.9 hours per week preparing for class while control teachers spend an average of only 4.1 hours/week. Experimental teachers also work together much more than control teachers. The experimental teachers in almost every grade have regular grade level meetings to coordinate their efforts and assist each other.

27. Experimental school teachers will spend less time in class on clerical/administrative duties than control school teachers will.

Results: Neither group of teachers is required to spend a lot of time doing clerical type duties. All of them spend some time in the mornings taking roll, etc. but this is fairly minor. There is little data on clerical duties which seems to indicate that it is not significant in either school.

28. Experimental teachers will have more meetings with each other than control teachers will.

Results: Experimental teachers spend .6 hours/week more in teachers meetings than do control teachers. Interviews with experimental teachers indicate that this is not a result of the Incentives Project, but rather a result of the principal's desire to have meetings. Many teachers consider the amount of meetings a waste of time.

29. Experimental teachers will take a greater part in decision making for the school than control school teachers will.

Results: Control school teachers indicate in interviews with them that they feel a greater amount of autonomy with regard to books and curriculum than is indicated in interviews with experimental teachers. The experimental teachers often express a feeling of disenchantment with the principal because of the lack of influence they feel regarding decisions made for the school.

30. Experimental school teachers will request more instructional days while control school teachers will not.

Results: There have been no requests for additional instructional days in either school.

31. Experimental school teachers will request more resources (such as reading specialists, diagnostic testing, psychological counseling or extra materials) than control school teachers will.

Results: Requests for additional resources increased at both schools as the year progressed. Monitor reports indicated, however, that the experimental teachers applied more pressure on their administration for resources than the control teachers. Specifically, the reading resource teacher was innundated with requests for assistance.

32. Teacher absenteeism will be less in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Teacher absenteeism has been low all year in both schools. With the exception of one control teacher, there is no significant difference between the experimental and control school.

33. Experimental school students will study in groups outside of school more than control school students will.

Results: There has been no evidence of group study among control or experimental students outside of school.

34. Experimental school students will study together more in school than control students will.

Results: Although it is difficult to collect "objective" data in this category, children seem to work together more in the experimental school where peer tutoring has been encouraged. While children do work in small groups in the control school, there does not seem to be as much interaction among students within the groups.

35. Experimental school students will be assigned more written work than control students will.

Results: There is no evidence to indicate that experimental school students have been assigned more written work than the control students. The classroom observations indicate that more writing was observed in the control school than in the observed experimental classrooms.

36. Experimental school children will be more involved in learning activities than control students will.

Results: Classroom observational data shows that students are generally interested and involved in classroom activities. There seems to be no difference in the degree of involvement between control and experimental school.

37. There will be more peer tutoring among experimental school students than control school students.

Results: The degree of peer tutoring is somewhat greater in the experimental school than in the control school. Peer tutoring, however, is not a technique used in either school to any great extent.

38. More classroom control and discipline will be done by students among themselves in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Children rarely are observed trying to discipline one another. This is the case at both the experimental and control schools.

39. Experimental school students will have a more positive attitude toward reading than control school students will.

Results: Children's attitude to reading as indicated by their involvement and progress seems to be very good in both schools. Both experimental and control parents interviews indicate that approximately 85% of both groups feel that their children are doing better this year. Children are most often attentive and interested in classwork in both schools.

40. Experimental school students will have a better attitude toward arithmetic than control school students will have.

Results: Children's attitudes toward arithmetic are good in both schools. As an indication of this, approximately 80% of both parent groups feel children are doing better this year in arithmetic.

41. Experimental school students will be more concerned for the success of their peers than control school students will.

Results: Although the reports indicate that children in both schools try to help each other, there is no evidence that either group of children is very concerned for the success of their peers.

Section III: Oakland, California

1. Parents of children in the experimental school will be more aware of the child's progress in reading than control school parents will be.

Results: Experimental and control school parents are quite aware of what is going on in reading classes as both groups are pretty heavily involved in the schools. More experimental parents feel their children are doing better in reading than last year (66%) as compared to control parents who feel that way (55%).

2. Parents of children in the experimental school will be more aware of the child's progress in arithmetic than parents of children in the control school.

Results: Parental awareness of arithmetic programs is less than their awareness of reading, but they are still seemingly more involved than parents at other sites. The experimental and control parents have similar opinions regarding the children's progress in arithmetic; 49% of the experimental parents feel the children are doing better and 40% of the control parents feel that way.

3. There will be more parent/teacher contact in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Control school parents, according to parent interviews, have contacted teachers more than experimental parents have. 90% of control parents interviewed have been in contact with teachers while 77% of experimental parents interviewed report contacting teachers.

4. Experimental school parents will do more school related work with other parents than control parents will.

Results: Neither the experimental nor control school parents work together outside of school functions, but they do communicate with each other to some degree. Of the experimental parents interviewed, 17% discussed school with other parents, whereas 30% of control parents interviewed claimed to have communicated with other parents.

5. Parents of experimental school children will attend more PTA meetings and/or school functions than control parents will.

Results: Experimental parents seem to be more deeply involved with the school and attend formal school functions more often than control parents. However, the actual percentages of parents interviewed who attend meetings are low (20%

of experimental parents and 5% of control parents attend school functions). Those who do attend meetings are quite vocal, however, and seem to be more deeply involved in the experimental school as judged by the intensity of their feelings.

6. There will be more written comments between school and home in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Written comments between parents and school are so minimal as to be virtually non-existant in both schools.

7. Experimental school parents will spend more time helping their children with school related work than control school parents will.

Results: Experimental school parents seem to help their children with homework somewhat more than do control school parents. 86% of experimental parents reported helping their children while 75% of the control school parents claimed to assist the children.

8. Experimental school parents will spend more money buying academic materials to assist their children's progress than control school parents will.

Results: There is not a great deal of information regarding purchases by parents but a number of both control and experimental parents have purchased sets of encyclopedias because of a special offered at a local supermarket. There is not a discernible difference, however, between groups in the actual amounts of money spent in this way.

9. Experimental school parents will have higher aspirations for their children than will control school parents.

Results: There is no evidence noted from observations or interviews that either control parents or experimental parents have higher aspirations for their children.

10. Experimental school parents will encourage their children to help each other with school work more than control school parents will.

Results: Parents in both schools encourage peer tutoring within the family though not much outside the family. Parents and/or older siblings, reportedly help the younger ones with their work. Monitoring reports indicate that there is no significant difference between the control and experimental schools.

11. In the experimental school families there will be more parental pressure on children to succeed than there will be in the control school families.

Results: It would seem there is somewhat more parental pressure on children in the experimental school to succeed. Monitor reports have indicated that the experimental children know about the project and that it may bring money to them or their families.

12. Experimental school parents will have a better attitude toward teachers than will control school parents.

Results: Although the experimental school has experienced some very vocal negative parent reactions to some of its teachers, in total, the majority of both the experimental and control parents like and approve of the teachers. 74% of the experimental parents interviewed approved of the teachers, and 75% of the control parents did; other parents expressed neutral positions, but none expressed disapproval of the teachers.

13. Experimental school parents will have a more positive attitude toward the project than control school parents will.

Results: Although the majority of parents in both schools (experimental - 63%, control 60%) approve of the Incentives Project, there have been very loud negative reactions to it over the entire year. The greatest cause for dissension was the fact that parents were not consulted prior to its installation. They didn't like allowing their children to be used for an experiment without having first given their consent.

14. Experimental parents will have a more favorable attitude to their child's program than control parents will.

Results: Again, the parents are generally very approving of the children's programs and in this area there is little difference between the experimental and control schools.

15. Experimental school parents will have more favorable attitudes toward the school in general than control school parents will.

Results: Control school parents have a much better attitude toward their school than do experimental parents. This is based almost entirely on the differences between the building principals. The control school principal simply inspires more trust and confidence from parents while experimental parents show concern for the seeming lack of organization in that school.

16. Experimental school teachers will spend more time teaching reading than control school teachers will.

Results: Experimental school reading teachers do seem to be showing more anxiety about their success than do control reading teachers. On average, the experimental teachers spend 1-1/2 hours/week more on reading instruction than control teachers spend.

17. There will be more references to reading skills observed in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Toward the end of the year, there appeared to be a higher degree of competition between reading classes in the experimental school than in the control school. Indicators such as bulletin board references to reading and class libraries suggest that there are no differences between the two schools.

18. Experimental teachers will spend more time teaching arithmetic than control teachers will.

Results: Experimental teachers, again, are spending more time on arithmetic instruction (6.3 hours/week) than are control school teachers (4.8 hours/week). A difference of 1-1/2 hours/week, as in reading, could make a very significant difference in the resulting skill levels of the children.

19. There will be more references to arithmetic skills in the experimental school than there will be in the control school.

Results: Experimental teachers do not seem to make more outside reference to arithmetic than do control teachers, but this area is not well documented. Results according to parents in experimental and control homes are very much the same in both areas.

20. Experimental school teachers will exercise greater control and exert more discipline over their classes than control school teachers will.

Results: We do not have records of the exact numbers of disciplinary referrals from either school. Monitor's reports, however, indicate that there are more in the control school. The control principal is very effective in the area of discipline, thus, teachers tend to refer their serious problems to him. Experimental teachers, on the other hand, hesitate to refer problems to the principal because they feel they can handle problems better themselves. Other data from classroom observations shows that experimental teachers administer punishment themselves significantly more often than control teachers do.

21. Experimental school teachers will encourage peer tutoring among students more than control school teachers will.

Results: Teachers in both schools encourage peer tutoring among students to a high degree. This seems to free teachers for more individual instruction efforts. The comparison between schools, however, shows that peer tutoring is encouraged to about the same degree in both schools.

22. Experimental school teachers will use individual instructional materials more than control school teachers will.

Results: There are a few individual instruction aids in either school although teachers make many of their own. Experimental teachers have deluged the principal with requests for more resources, whereas few demands for similar resources have been reported from the control school.

23. Experimental school teachers will spend a greater part of their time instructing students individually than control school teachers will.

Results: Classroom observations show that little time is spent by teachers in either school working individually with students. It would appear, from the teachers' statements, that experimental teachers are more dedicated to the idea of individual instruction than control teachers. The evidence, however, is not substantial enough to indicate any definitive difference between the schools.

24. Experimental school teachers will spend more time testing their students than control school teachers will.

Results: Monitor's observations show that more testing has been going on in the control school, but this observation is particularly skewed by the use of different monitors at the end of the year with the new one spending more time in the control school. It is possible, certainly, that more testing was done in the control school, but not as much more as is indicated by the data. Generally speaking, it is more accurate to say that the amount of time spent testing is similar in both schools. This observation is based on other teaching activities which do not show such an amazing difference.

25. Experimental school teachers will use material rewards for good student behavior or work more than control teachers will.

Results: Monitor's observations and data collected over the year show that experimental teachers use rewards for the children more than do control teachers. The intensity of reward giving is really relatively light, however, in both schools.

26. Experimental school teachers will spend more time preparing lesson plans than control school teachers will.

Results: Although experimental teachers spend more time teaching reading than control teachers do, both groups spend the same amount of time preparing for reading classes. However, experimental teachers spend, on average, a little over two hours per week more than control teachers in preparing for math classes.

27. Experimental school teachers will spend less time in class on clerical/administrative duties than control school teachers will.

Results: There is no evidence that the experimental school teachers spend less time on clerical/administrative duties than the control school teachers. In fact, both groups are required to do the same amount of prescribed clerical duties for state and local records.

28. Experimental school teachers will have more meetings with each other than control school teachers will.

Results: Control school teachers spend one hour per week in meetings which is close to 1/2 hour per week more than experimental teachers. Experimental teachers would like to have more meetings, but the experimental principal seems to prefer otherwise.

29. Experimental teachers will take a greater part in decision making for the school than control school teachers will.

Results: Control school teachers indicate having slightly more autonomy in the areas of books and curriculum than experimental teachers. However, this percentage is slight enough to indicate that autonomy is probably the same but control teachers may have a better working relationship with their principal.

30. Experimental school teachers will request more instructional days while control school teachers will not.

Results: There have been no additional instructional days in either the control or experimental schools.

31. Experimental school teachers will request more resources (such as reading specialists, diagnostic testing, psychological counseling or extra materials) than control school teachers will.

Results: There have been a great deal more requests for more resources in the experimental school than in the control school. In fact, the principal felt at one point, that if he tried to keep up with all requests, he would have no time left for his regular administrative tasks.

32. Teacher absenteeism will be less in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Teacher absenteeism seems to be minimal at both schools although we do not have the exact records. However, it does not seem that the Incentives Project has caused any great changes in absenteeism in either school.

33. Experimental school students will study in groups outside of school more than control school students will.

Results: There is no evidence of group study among students outside of school in either the control or the experimental school.

34. Experimental school students will study together more in school than control students will.

Results: A rather large amount of group study has been observed in both schools throughout the year. The degree to which students participate in groups is, however, similar between the experimental and control schools.

35. Experimental school students will be assigned more written work than control students will.

Results: Observational data does not show an increase in students doing written work in either school over the year. The control school observations seem to show students doing more written work than experimental students, but not enough more to be of any significant nature.

36. Experimental school children will be more involved in learning activities than control students will.

Results: Observations show that in both schools, children are nearly always paying attention and are generally well involved in their work. There does not seem to be any difference in student involvement between the control and experimental schools.

37. There will be more peer tutoring among experimental school students than control school students.

Results: The students in both schools are generally quite helpful to one another; they are encouraged to work together and assist each other. There is no difference, however, between the experimental and control schools in the degree to which students help one another.

38. More classroom control and discipline will be done by students among themselves in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Students in both schools have been noted to do such things as warn each other of some impending teacher action or to hush each other when the monitors enter, etc. However, there is no formal pupil discipline control encouraged by teachers and there is no significant difference between experimental and control schools.

39. Experimental school students will have a more positive attitude toward reading than control school students will.

Results: Very little has been observed regarding pupils attitudes to reading. It seems, however, that progress is good at least as perceived by parents. 66% of experimental parents interviewed think their children are doing better than last year, and 55% of the control parents feel that way, which indicates that the difference in pupil attitudes between schools is probably minimal.

40. Experimental school students will have a better attitude toward arithmetic than control school students will have.

Results: Student attitudes toward arithmetic seem to be quite average in both schools. This is indicated most especially in parent views of their children's progress. 49% of experimental parents think children are doing better in arithmetic this year and 40% of the control parents feel that way.

41. Experimental school students will be more concerned for the success of their peers than control school students will.

Results: Students in both schools help each other and work together, but no evidence shows how concerned they are with the success of their peers. This is the case with both the experimental and control schools.

Section IV: San Antonio, Texas

1. Parents of children in the experimental schools will be more aware of the child's progress in reading than control school parents will be.

Results: Most parents do not seem to be aware of their children's programs in reading although they do know generally what kind of progress the children are making because of report cards. Parental opinions of children's progress are very similar between the experimental and control schools; 15% of the experimental parents thought their children were doing better this year and 18% of the control parents felt that was the case with their children.

2. Parents of children in the experimental school will be more aware of the child's progress in arithmetic than parents of children in the control schools.

Results: There is very little specific data regarding how parents feel about their children's progress in arithmetic which indicates that they are not very aware of those programs. The experimental and control parents, again, express very similar opinions as to their children's progress, however, 16% of the experimental parents think their children are doing worse, and 9% of the control parents feel their children are doing better while 13% feel they are doing worse.

3. There will be more parent/teacher contact in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Parents seem to be interested in making contacts with the teachers, but control parents are somewhat more active in this regard (i.e., 45% of control parents interviewed have contacted teachers) than experimental parents (36% of the experimental parents interviewed have contacted teachers).

4. Experimental school parents will do more school related work with other parents than control parents will.

Results: The amount of parents' involvement with other parents of either school is negligible. 3% of the experimental parents interviewed had discussed school with other parents, while 6% of the control parents interviewed had talked with other parents.

5. Parents of experimental school children will attend more PTA meetings and/or school functions than control parents will.

Results: Although monitor's reports indicate that parental attendance at PTA meetings and school functions is good, data from their interviews reveals that this

attendance is average--and greater for the control parents (38% attended meetings) than for the experimental parents (26% attended meetings).

6. There will be more written comments between school and home in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: There has been no indication of written comments between parents and school in either school except what teachers may write on report cards.

7. Experimental school parents will spend more time helping their children with school related work than control school parents will.

Results: There is very little difference between experimental and control parents in the amount of help they offer their children. 84% of the experimental parents interviewed said they helped their children with homework while 90% of the control parents interviewed said they did. 68% of the experimental parents indicated they did other "special" things to assist the children in school and 69% of the control parents did, indicating that the difference between the parent groups is really non-existant in this area.

8. Experimental school parents will spend more money buying academic materials to assist their children's progress than control school parents will.

Results: Monitor reports data indicates that there have been no unusual purchases by experimental or control school parents with regard to improving children's skills. Most parents try to keep their children supplied with the necessities; some have bought games, books, or encyclopedias, but still there seems to be no particular difference in degree of purchases between experimental and control school parents.

9. Experimental school parents will have higher aspirations for their children than will control school parents.

Results: There is no data to suggest that experimental parents have any higher hopes or greater aspirations than do control school parents.

10. Experimental school parents will encourage their children to help each other with school work more than control school parents will.

Results: In many cases, in both schools, parents encourage older children to help younger ones, but this tendency does not differ between the two schools.

11. In the experimental school families there will be more parental pressure on children to succeed than there will be in the control school families.

Results: Parents in both schools seem to feel their children could work harder than they do. 97% of the experimental parents interviewed felt their children had too little homework, while 93% of the control parents felt that way. Although they feel this way, they don't seem to put any great pressure on the children to do well or on teachers to give them more work. Again, these trends are very much the same in both schools.

12. Experimental school parents will have a better attitude toward teachers than will control school parents.

Results: Parents feelings regarding teachers in both schools are very similar. 64% of experimental parents and 69% of control parents feel the teachers are doing a very good job, while only 2% of the experimental parents and 9% of the control parents interviewed didn't like the teachers or felt they were doing a poor job.

13. Experimental school parents will have a more positive attitude toward the project than control school parents will.

Results: Both groups of parents seem to have always been basically in favor of the project. Among experimental parents there have been very few adverse opinions and a great many of the contracts were signed and returned almost immediately It is difficult to compare experimental and control parents regarding their attitudes to the project since control parents were not as closely related to the project and were not asked their specific feelings about it.

14. Experimental parents will have a more favorable attitude to their child's program than control parents will.

Results: Again, there seems to be very little difference between control and experimental parents in their attitudes to their children's programs. Nearly all parents interviewed have favorable attitudes and there is no significant difference between schools.

15. Experimental school parents will have more favorable attitudes toward the school in general than control school parents will.

Results: Parents in both schools have a very cooperative attitude toward the schools. They are not highly involved with the activities of the schools although PTA meetings are fairly well attended. Basically, the parents approve of the schools and their acitivites and there is no marked difference in the degree of interest between experimental and control school parents.

16. Experimental school teachers will spend more time teaching reading than control school teachers will.

Results: Experimental teachers, on the average, spend a little over one hour/week more time teaching reading than control school teachers do. The majority of parents (64% experimental and 51% control parents), however, feel their children are making the same progress in reading as last year.

17. There will be more references to reading skills observed in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: There is very little evidence in the data received regarding references to reading in either school. However, with teachers spending over 9 hours/week on reading in the experimental school and 8 hours/week in the control school, the emphasis on reading is obviously strong. The experimental teachers, especially, seem to feel that reading skills are more important than other areas. The difference between experimental teachers and control teachers, however, is not great.

18. Experimental school teachers will spend more time teaching arithmetic than control school teachers will.

Results: Teachers in neither school seem to be spending a lot of time on arithmetic skills. The 5.3 average hours/week for experimental teachers is only slightly higher than that for control teachers, which is 4.5 hours/week. 70% of the experimental parents and 79% of control parents felt their children were making the same progress as last year in arithmetic which seems to show that neither group of teachers is working any harder than usual on arithmetic.

19. There will be more references to arithmetic skills in the experimental school than there will be in the control school.

Results: References to arithmetic in other things such as displays, extra activities, etc. are very minute. Teachers in both schools seem to spend an average amount of time teaching arithmetic.

20. Experimental school teachers will exercise greater control and exert more discipline over their classes than control school teachers will.

Results: Teachers at the control school seem to handle more discipline problems themselves while experimental school teachers refer more of their problems to the principal. However, discipline problems seem to have been minimal at both schools.

21. Experimental school teachers will encourage peer tutoring among students more than control school teachers will.

Results: There is a very small degree of peer tutoring in both schools. The teachers don't encourage children to work with each other and data from classroom observation guides shows that students don't work together when they are in class even though they were organized in groups.

22. Experimental school teachers will use individual instructional materials more than control school teachers will.

Results: The experimental school principal has tried without success to get extra resource materials for her teachers. The teachers have prepared many of the materials for the children themselves. It seems that there has been more effort in this area in the experimental school, without success. There really is not much individual type instructional material in either school.

23. Experimental school teachers will spend a greater part of their time instructing students individually than control school teachers will.

Results: Evidence from classroom observations shows a very small degree of individual instruction in all classrooms, either experimental or control.

24. Experimental school teachers will spend more time testing their students than control teachers will.

Results: There has been very little information regarding testing from either school and no mention of accustoming the children to taking tests like the post-tests. Teacher interviews reveal that experimental teachers spend a little bit less time testing (7.05% of class time) than do control teachers (7.42% of class time).

25. Experimental school teachers will use material rewards for good student behavior or work more than control teachers will.

Results: In both schools, the type of reward used most often is verbal praise or recognition. There is little use in either school of material rewards and there seems, again, to be very little difference between the experimental and control groups.

26. Experimental school teachers will spend more time preparing lessons than control teachers will.

Results: Neither the experimental nor control school teachers spend very much time preparing for their classes and making lesson plans. The experimental teachers spend slightly more time (5.1 hours per week) than do control teachers (4.3 hours per week).

27. Experimental school teachers will spend less time in class on clerical/administrative duties than control school teachers will.

Results: Neither school requires much from its teachers in the way of clerical and administrative duties. Principals and aides do most of the hall duty or lunch room monitoring. Teachers spend some time during class taking roll or counting for lunches but that seems to be about all they are responsible for. The cases are similar in both schools.

28. Experimental school teachers will have more meetings with each other than control school teachers will.

Results: It seems, generally, that the experimental school has greater communication between administration and faculty than the control school. Experimental school teachers also spend .6 hours/week more in meetings than control teachers do.

29. Experimental teachers will take a greater part in decision making for the school than control teachers will.

Results: Monitor reports indicate that experimental teachers have more influence upon decisions made for the school because the principal is more responsive to their desires. However, reports indicate that teachers' autonomy in both schools is approximately the same. In the area of curriculum, 94% of experimental teachers feel they are influential and in the control school, all teachers interviewed feel that way.

30. Experimental school teachers will request more instructional days while control school teachers will not.

Results: There have not been any extra instructional days in either school.

31. Experimental school teachers will request more resources (such as reading specialists, diagnostic testing, psychological counseling or extra materials) than control school teachers will.

Results: Experimental reading teachers have requested additional resources much more than experimental arithmetic teachers have and more than all teachers in the control school have. 47% of the experimental reading teachers mention requesting more materials while only 9% of the experimental arithmetic teachers have; in the control school, only 4% of all teachers have requested more resources.

32. Teacher absenteeism will be less in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: There was no difference in the rate of teacher absenteeism at the experimental school and control school. Both had very low incidences of absenteeism with the exception of a short period when a flu epidemic hit the community.

33. Experimental school students will study in groups outside of school more than control school students will.

Results: There is no reported evidence of group studying outside of school among either control or experimental school students.

34. Experimental school students will study together more in school than control students will.

Results: Children in both schools do much classwork in small groups although very little of this work requires them to cooperate with each other. The degree of group work seems to be about the same in both the experimental and control schools.

35. Experimental school students will be assigned more written work than control students will.

Results: Students in both schools seem to spend a good part of their time in class on written work. There does not seem to be any difference between the experimental and control schools, however, in the amount of time they spend writing.

36. Experimental school children will be more involved in learning activities than control school students will.

Results: Classroom observations show that students in both schools seem to be interested and involved in their work. The intensity of this involvement does not differ to any significant degree between the experimental and control schools.

37. There will be more peer tutoring among experimental school students than control students.

Results: There is very little peer tutoring in either school. Teachers seem to encourage children to work in groups but not to work together in those groups. The major trend, which is the same in both schools, is for children to work mostly on their own.

38. More classroom control and discipline will be done by students among themselves in the experimental school than in the control school.

Results: Just as there was little evidence of students working together, there were very few reports of peer discipline. Certainly, the field reports indicate that there was no more peer activity in the experimental school than in the control school.

39. Experimental school students will have a more positive attitude toward reading than control students will.

Results: The attitudes of the children toward reading seem to be good at both the experimental and control schools. The monitor reports indicate that the project has had no effect on student attitude in that there was no observed difference between the experimental and control schools.

40. Experimental school students will have a better attitude toward arithmetic than control students will have.

Results: Children's attitudes about arithmetic are good in both schools although not as enthusiastic as with reading. Once again, there is very little difference in the degree of student interest in arithmetic between the experimental and control schools.

41. Experimental school students will be more concerned for the success of their peers than control students will.

Results: As students have not been noted to exert pressure on peers to succeed, so also do they not show particular concern for the success of their peers. They certainly do not ignore each other, but they are not encouraged to help each other and, thus, do not show any more than normal concern for the success of peers. This is the case in both the experimental and control schools.